Deliverable D2.2: The Political Perspective

A report presenting a review of the key features raised by the political perspectives of surveillance and democracy

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: THE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

Task Description

This Task will review the key contributions to knowledge emerging from political (including political science and policy studies) perspectives of surveillance and democracy. Included within this perspective are approaches which consider changes in democratic values, such as accountability, transparency, equality, the rule of law, rights and freedoms, those which consider changes in democratic policy-making practices and procedures, and how these have changed over time in different democratic settings.

Overview

This Task considers what the literature on surveillance has to say with regard to several closely related issues that are highly relevant to an understanding of social and political effects. In Chapter 1, we start with a discussion of fear and insecurity – often encouraged by the mass media – underlying the demand for an intensification of surveillance. As the phenomenon of fear plays a part in social and political control, we highlight the crucial role of the mass media in inculcating and communicating fear through its narratives that contribute to ‘moral panics’, the creation of ‘folk devils’, and the amplification of deviance. We include an account of the way in which the climate of fear, in turn, serves to shape the technologies of surveillance and the public demand for such tools in the ‘risk society’. We then consider the resilience of societies in the face of terrorist and other threats, posing several questions that open up important dimensions for further investigation, before looking extensively at the experience of surveillance in countries recently emerging from the control of repressive, non-democratic regimes and moving towards the democratic end of the spectrum of political systems. We finally highlight the distortions of democratic debate and decision-making brought about by the climate of fear and the surveillance that it sustains.

We subscribe to the view that surveillance can – albeit with difficulty, and with considerable variation across jurisdictions, levels of jurisdiction, and types of surveillance – be brought within the limits expected in democratic, accountable political systems governed by the rule of law. In reversing the discussion to explore this view, Chapter 2 therefore deals with surveillance as a tool that is subject to regulation, limitation and control. We examine policy-making for surveillance, both in terms of putting surveillance on a legitimate footing and keeping it in bounds through the actions of political and governmental systems. Our discussion of policy-making is illustrated with the case of data retention, a policy subject that has been greatly controversial in the EU and between it and third countries in recent years. We investigate accountability and transparency as central norms of democratic, non-authoritarian political systems, norms that also play their part in the control of surveillance whether the latter is deployed by organisations in the public or private sector. Accountability is one method of keeping surveillance and its users in check, but the discussion reveals current deficiencies in accountability practices in the context of data protection. Transparency is another important check because it scrutinises the use of power in a democracy and acts as a vehicle for public participation in debates. The relationship of mutual dependence between transparency
and privacy is explored at some length, before the need for transparency in a democracy is discussed in terms of factors that inhibit and promote it, and some transparency-based privacy solutions are canvassed. The rule of law as a pillar of democratic constitutional states, and the position of rights and freedoms as criteria for evaluating surveillance, are also discussed, while the governance of surveillance is described in terms of the repertory of instruments and actors that expand the possibilities beyond the enactment, implementation and adjudication of statutory law or other legal provisions. Moving on, the governance of surveillance is given an overview in terms of the networks of state and societal actors – going beyond government itself – that are involved in regulating surveillance practices and protecting privacy through the use of interrelated regulatory instruments.

Details of the main subject areas reviewed by the Task Partners

The media are implicated in the surveillance process by making crime newsworthy, by amplifying fears, and by constructing ‘folk devils’ and ‘moral panics’, although such imputations in the literature should be regarded with circumspection. Nevertheless, the media do play a large part in shaping attitudes towards dangers and the dangerous, and in contributing to a climate in which surveillance, through the use of a variety of technologies, seems an attractive solution in what criminologists and others have called a ‘risk society’. Public insecurity, in turn, is said to inhibit and distort policy debate and decision-making by promoting what is politically popular. This promotion brushes aside a fuller evaluation of the side-effects and economic drawbacks which might otherwise suggest that solutions to crime, terrorism, and other problems can be addressed by alternative strategies and policies that do not necessarily involve intrusive surveillance. How to deal with risk is a subject for considering the relationship between resilience and prevention and precaution, and this question is aired with reference to literature on individual resilience in the face of real or perceived threats. Important research questions arise from this.

Several pages are devoted to an investigation of the experience of surveillance in different democratic contexts that include former repressive regimes and the new democracies that have succeeded them in the former “Soviet Bloc” countries as well as in the former autocratic regimes in Southern Europe. The role of state-controlled surveillance organisations is discussed, as well as the particular circumstances and problems of dealing with the surveillance and secrecy legacies in these new democracies. Public attitudes of fear and distrust, and appreciation of rights and freedoms, have been powerfully shaped by living under these non-democratic regimes, and there remain many unanswered questions about how the different successor systems, and their populations, will deal with the continuing reality of surveillance in the midst of their democratising efforts.

One of the political effects of fear and insecurity even in ‘mature’ democracies’ is the way they distort debate and political decision-making towards reactive, ill-considered policies and measures that overlook unwanted side-effects, tend to ignore contradictory evidence of the efficacy of policies, and brush aside considerations of right and liberties. On a broader canvas, understanding the political perspective involves looking at policy-making and surveillance in terms of the dispersal of surveillance policies over a range of separate domains and settings (e.g., education
and transport), policy idioms, and jurisdictions, and embedded in various practices, including the delivery of public services, e-government, and many others. Data retention is not normally thought of as a form of surveillance because it is a non-visual, non-real time, empirically unnoticeable form of observation and control of citizens. It is pervasive, involving both the public and private sectors in a relationship that requires a flow of information that blurs the boundaries of responsibility for posing dangers to privacy. We discuss data retention as a case in the study of surveillance policy. Data retention emerged on the EU policy agenda as part of counter-terrorism efforts, resulting in the Data Retention Directive of 2006. There are several critical perceptions of data retention in different democratic contexts. Member States regard it as valuable or indispensable, but little statistical or other evidence exists for such conclusions to be reached; thus they are political rather than evidence-based, and some evidence supports the opposite case. Data retention is seen as undermining democracy and a free society by eroding the rights to privacy and anonymity, the presumption of innocence, and social confidence. Some survey evidence shows that data retention chills social and political relations and practices among citizens, and on freedoms. Some Member State judicial authorities have ruled data retention unconstitutional. Cost-benefit analyses have raised doubts about efficiency and economic benefits of data retention.

Looking at ways of regulating, limiting and controlling surveillance, the discussion then dwells at some length and in depth on the importance of the accountability of surveillance in a democratic society in the instance of data protection, in which accountability is being heavily promoted as a regulatory strategy by the EU and the private sector, especially following major data losses and breaches. The argument is that, while the development of accountability as part of information governance is a good step, it confuses responsibility for actions and performances of functions (e.g., surveillance) with answerability for these functions through publicly available accounts, or ‘stories’ that could be challenged. Accountability in this sense would be consistent with other areas of democratic political practice. It bears a close relationship with transparency, which is also discussed at length and in several dimensions as an attribute of a democratic polity promoting public debate and participation. The relationship between privacy and transparency is highly important, and is argued to be one of interdependence and complementarity. The exercise of privacy rights is contingent upon the transparency of surveillance practices, and the success of transparency mechanisms depends on the cognitive, social and legal status of the audience for the available information.

Moving on to consider the surveillance in relation to rights, freedoms and the rule of law, we point out that the rule of law has formal and substantive dimensions, respectively connoting rule by law, legislative processes, and consent, on the one hand, and individual rights, justice and the right to dignity, and substantive equality of welfare, on the other. Privacy and data protection are directly implicated in all of this, with privacy as a tool of opacity and data protection as a tool of transparency. The European Court of Human Rights has struggled to reconcile surveillance with democracy by means of interpretations of the rule of law in specific cases. This discussion of law, rights and freedoms leads to an analysis of the broader governance of surveillance through a range of instruments of which the legal order and the rule of law are not the only ones currently experienced or capable of further development.
‘Surveillance policy’ as such is elusive and not singular: discerning its content is not straightforward, and understanding the processes through which it is made and implemented requires complex analysis, as the discussion of governance then shows. The ubiquity and variety of surveillance technologies and practices are governed – albeit with limited and variable success – by regimes at various jurisdictional levels (e.g., local, national, regional, global) and with various regulatory tools. Among these are laws; regulatory bodies such as data protection authorities; codes of practice; technological instruments such as privacy-enhancing technologies, privacy by design, encryption, identity assurance systems using anonymity; and the promotion of greater public awareness so that they may safeguard their own privacy. The regulatory landscape has shifted in many respects towards an interest in newer instruments that might be able to cope better with new contexts – the online and social-networking environment, for instance – than can more traditional, law-based instruments, although the latter remain indispensable. There is also a wide range of policy actors, in which formal ‘policy-makers’ and regulators are not alone. Whether or not the governance of surveillance is, or can be, carried out by coherent, well-integrated, and strategically deployed actors, tools, and principles is a crucial question.

Key themes and emergent findings

The discussions outlined above point towards several provisional themes and findings:

a. surveillance practices of all kinds impinge on a large range of rights, freedoms, liberties, and social and political relationships and processes that affect the nature and texture of life in democratic societies and political systems;

b. public attitudes, perceptions, fears, expectations and demands are shaped by many forces, among which the mass media are one of the most powerful, tending towards a particular appreciation of surveillance, its technologies, and its role in reducing threats and the level of fear;

c. social insecurity feeds policy demands for surveillance that tend to limit genuine debate and to ignore the disadvantages and externalities of making life safer and more secure through surveillance, and societal resilience or, on the other hand, precautionary anticipation of threats, are at issue in these processes;

d. the accountability and transparency of surveillance, and the rule of law, are essential in a democratic society, and need to be improved and made potent in order to limit surveillance;

e. the governance of surveillance, and surveillance policy-making, are highly complex and sometimes ephemeral processes that need to be comprehended and rationalised if surveillance is to be regulated in accordance with democratic values.
Conclusion

This Task has something in common with others in IRISS, although it introduces new perspectives and avenues of analysis, and approaches fresh topics that bear upon our understanding of the political dimensions of surveillance and its regulation. Empirical evidence is often at a premium, however, when assertions are made about the benefits or disadvantages of surveillance to the experience of living in democratic society. Nevertheless, the themes identified above provide ample scope for further theoretical work and empirical research oriented towards practical improvement in the resilience of democratic societies faced both with many threats of criminal and terrorist behaviour, and with the dangers that accompany the surveillance tools employed to counter these.
1. **CHAPTER 1: SURVEILLANCE AS A TOOL FOR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTROL**

1.1 **THE INDUCTION OF FEAR BY THE MEDIA**

In this section and the next, attention is given to the phenomenon of fear, which provides an important context within which surveillance plays a part in social and political control. Surveillance practices both contribute to the construction of fear and offer themselves as tools for allaying it. Fear is powerfully communicated and disseminated through the media. First, we discuss the part played by the media in inducing fear and in identifying and constructing the subjects, objects, and processes on which surveillance attention may be focused. In the next section of Task 2.2, we look at the way in which the use of surveillance technologies is shaped through fear-shaping narratives.

We begin by looking at a powerful generator of political activity in the field of surveillance – fear – and how public moods and demands are shaped by media treatments of social and political events and developments. Media discourse serves to create a climate in which surveillance may be seen as a desirable and appropriate response for controlling certain phenomena or behaviour, or at least for allaying the fear that such “distortions” of social life as crime, disorder or terrorism are contrary to valued norms and practices of civilised society and public order that need to be restored or reinforced. On the other hand, surveillance itself can contribute to a climate of fear. This is because surveillance devices and practices may leave people uncertain about their safety because the very “need” for, and ubiquity of, surveillance conveys the impression that they live in dangerous times or places, at least until specific applications of surveillance are normalised and routinised, as they are, for example, in the transport systems of most EU countries. In policy processes, this fear, perception of danger, and appreciation of desirable safety and security systems may become translated into popular expectation of political and governmental action. Political and governmental actors find it hard to go against the grain of this pressure and desire, thus fuelling the demand for legislative or administrative measures of surveillance and restricting the force that regulatory measures, and the human rights or civil liberties that such measures uphold, might bring to the policy table.

1.1.1 **The media and fear in modern society**

This subsection deals with theoretical reflection on the connection between media consumption and fear, which has been the subject of mainly criminological research up to now. In the interests of clarity we illustrate briefly the current state of research as a communication process; however, some relevant observations must be made about this.

First, “the media” are mainly treated as one homogeneous actor, although there have been massive changes in the media landscape over the past decades, as we point out in a later subsection. In the classic surveys on the connection between crime, news, and fear, the prevailing question was about the extent to which there are different effects of media consumption depending on whether it is print media (daily
newspaper or journal), radio, or television (both local and national). Today’s media landscape, however, can no longer be described as an oligopolistic constellation with only a few well known actors offering all of the information. There are an enormous, and global, number of information sources covering all of political, cultural, economic life. Another massive difference lies in the fact that information sources are no longer restricted to national borders: people today can easily read, watch and listen to media information from all over the world, getting different perspectives on a subject. A last point is that the differentiation between text, audio, and visual content can no longer be maintained if one considers news sites on the contemporary Internet, where all forms of media are jointly used.

Second, the role of fear is, as Hankiss claims, “much neglected in the social sciences”: it does receive “serious attention in philosophy, theology and psychiatry, less in anthropology and social psychology, and least of all in sociology”. As a result of this under-theorisation of fear, empirical research on risk and uncertainty increases. Furedi tries to sum up the contemporary condition in contrast to the “age of anxiety”, a label given to the 20th century by some authors. The prevailing “culture of fear” is however characterised by the construction of a multiplicity of specific objects of fears (crime, disease, poverty, and so on), which in the short run gives (risk-averse or -accepting) options for action. In that respect, asking how the “induction of fear by the media” works, one has to face questions of risk and action-taking as well. It is about constructing frightening perceptions of a certain situation, but also about connecting demands for collective (political) or individual action to it. The broad field of “crime” or “deviant behaviour”, which is the focus of this section, has served as a source of good examples of examining this process at work.

A general consensus among researchers concerns the fact, according to Young, that “in our extremely socially segregated society”, information about deviant behaviour comes almost exclusively from the media: “Direct experience of individuals with

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6 Furedi, Frank, “The only thing we have to fear is the ‘culture of fear’ itself”, 2007, Available on: http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?!site/article/3053/


behaviour different from our own conventions and values is rare.”

Grupp speaks of a shift from a “fearsome life towards a life with fearsome media”. Or, as Marsh and Melville put it:

“[..] in order to understand the reaction to deviance by the public and the authorities it is vital to consider the nature of information that they receive. In modern societies most information is received second hand, usually processed by the mass media and so subject to their definitions of what constitutes ‘news’ and how it is presented. And this information is also affected by the constraints which newspapers and broadcasters have to operate under – both commercial and political constraints.”

Thus there are always two questions to which research on the induction of fear by the media must pay attention: how and why certain acts are considered and presented as despicable crime; and how and why crimes are worthy of being presented as news. In other words, it is about analysing why specific issues are worth being feared and worth being reported.

1.1.2 Moral panics, folk devils, and the amplification of deviance

In the same vein as Young’s classic essay, much research has focused on why and how certain crimes are presented in a very sensational and anxious way. The basic argument is that the reporting of deviant behaviour constitutes the (desired) self-perception of a society. The degree of indignation can then be seen as a measure of how threatening a certain crime is towards the system of values of a society. In the case of drug use, Young states: “It is when drug use is seen as unrelated to productivity, when it leads to undeserved pleasures, when it gives rise to experiences which question the taken-for-granted reality, that the forces of condemnation are brought into play”.

These “forces of condemnation” can be analysed by looking at the nature of information given by the media, says Cohen. In his study, Cohen gives an insight of the “media inventory” of the “manufactured news” on the incidents of riots caused by juvenile delinquents (“Mods” and “Rockers”) in Britain in the 1960s. Comparing facts with reports, he finds a “gallery of folk types – heroes, saints, fools, villains, and

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devils” produced within a discourse characterised by exaggeration and distortion, dubious prediction, and symbolisation. The first two are discussed below in a more generalised way, whereas the creation and circulation of symbols as signals of fear is more informative here. Such symbolisation has three processes: “a word (mod) becomes symbolic of a certain status (delinquent or deviant); objects (hairstyle, clothing) symbolize the word; the objects themselves become symbolic of the status (and the emotions attached to the status).” Similar constellations are seen for other “moral panics” in the past; in the recent past, “hoodies” and “paedophiles” have created similar forms of attention, and the media discourse on “terrorists” – sometimes portrayed as Arab-named, bearded, white-clothed males – is likely to produce similar outcomes.

The creation of “folk devils” has largely been discussed within the “amplification of deviance” thesis, which can be summed up as follows: “An initial act of deviance ... is responded to punitively. The ... group of deviants is isolated ... and this operates to alienate them from conventional society. They perceive themselves as more deviant, group themselves with others in similar position, and this leads to more deviance. This process is of course not seen as deterministic. For example there are differentiations being made among deviant people: the sick, (who can’t help it), the innocent (who are corrupted), the wicked (who are corrupt) ...” The model of moral panics and folk devils, more or less connected with the amplification-of-deviance thesis, is nowadays criticised as being outdated in a “multi mediated society”. The main point of criticism is that moral panic can be seen as just a form of attention that many actors are actually looking for, rather than trying to avoid; or, in the words of McRobbie and Thornton, as the “culmination and fulfillment of youth cultural agendas in so far as negative news coverage baptizes transgression”. “Niche” and “micro media” may articulate single viewpoints or whole identities of youth culture, so that there is never one dominant, uncontested moral perspective on a certain phenomenon. As a result of this, multiple moral panics can be at work at the same time, each of them trying to get more attention; Marsh and Melville conclude in this respect, that “in a media saturated world, moral panics have less impact as nothing shocks us anymore.” This analysis and conclusion are perhaps overstated, because the process of creation of societal or international moral panics and folk devils can still be observed, and provides rationales for the surveillance of persons or groups constructed in these ways.

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16 Cohen, Stanley, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*. Paladin, St Albans, 1973, p. 30
1.1.3 What makes crime news?

Research on the newsworthiness of crime started in the 1970s with the work of Galtung and Ruge and of Chibnall. In the 1980s, Katz asked how the daily appetite for news is satisfied by the media. Jewkes sums up that research as leading to a 12-point catalogue of criteria ("news values"), that has to be fulfilled to make a crime newsworthy: threshold; predictability; simplification; individualism; risk; sex; celebrity or high-status persons; proximity; violence; spectacle or graphic imagery; children; and conservative ideology. Not all of these contribute to a feeling of fear to the same extent. "Risk" of course matters to a high degree: Furedi cites Guzelian, who says that "most fears in America’s electronic age" are the results of "risk-information (whether correct or false), that is communicated to society". Another element of the "feeling rules" relating to fear is addressed by Elin, who states that fear has "come home" and become privatised: that is, the creation of "proximity" and "individualism" of a reported crime (geographically as well as culturally) should be especially mentioned as inducing fear, whereas the involvement of a high-status person, for example, may not have that effect.

Another approach in researching the transformation of crime into news is made by Altheide, who analyses the way the reports work by looking at the textual structure more than on the content of a report. Based on that, he tries to develop a model to explain and predict how a certain topic develops, that is, gains attention in the "news environment". He finds that all contents are being presented within a "problem frame", which strongly appeals to fears and has the following characteristics: has a narrative structure; refers to universal moral meanings; refers to a specific time and place; creates an unambiguous judgment of the situation; has a focus on disorder (e.g., irresponsible behaviour or uncoordinated (re-)actions); and is "culturally resonant". Concerning the last point, Altheide links this "problem frame" to popular culture.

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25 For example regarding statistical values (“more than one incident per week”), or a non-precended degree of harm/violence.
26 For that argument see also: Cohen, Stanley, Folk Devils and Moral Panics. St Albans, Paladin, 1973, p. 38.
27 Simplification can be seen as was what was split up into “exaggeration” and “distortion” in Cohen, Stanley, Folk Devils and Moral Panics. St Albans: Paladin, 1973, p. 31.
(movies, shows, music), establishing an “entertainment perspective” that has to be co-produced by the media to make the crime attractive to readers and also to make it easier to remember. By connecting crime facts with cultural knowledge in that way, by blurring the borders between reality and fiction, media reports become “testimonies of fear”, closely related to “discourses of blame” and responsibilities. Similar to that, Katz sees a secondary function in reading crime news in enabling people to take a stand on existential moral dilemmas.

Altheide’s approach to frames (concerning the structure of the text) is complemented by simple content analyses, focusing on regularities in the vocabularies used. For example, he found that the term “fear” itself was used almost twice as often in media reports in general but even three times as much in the headlines, comparing datasets of American newspapers in 1984 and 1994. Television programmes showed an even higher increase for the same period. Since fear, as argued above, always implies an appeal to action, many metaphors can be found that try to symbolise this acute demand for action (“battle metaphors”).

Besides the news value of the crime itself and the textual manner in which it is presented, a third factor for the transformation of crime into news lies in the use of visual elements. Hall’s position has not been seriously challenged since then, but may even have been strengthened: news photos now and then “repress their ideological dimensions by offering themselves as literal visual transcriptions of the ‘real world’.” This “function of grounding and witnessing” is ever more accomplished, not only by means of CCTV cameras surveilling many public spaces, but as most people today are technically able and medically encouraged to surveil their environment.

1.2 FEARS SHAPING THE USE OF TECHNOLOGIES

We now analyse the role of fear within the process of deploying specific surveillance technologies, in particular after the terrorist attacks in 2001. We discuss the way in which fear is theorised in the social sciences, and the other factors that may shape the deployment of technologies.

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37 Altheide, David, “The News Media, the Problem Frame, and the Production of Fear”, The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 38 No. 4, 1997, p. 656. Altheide (p. 651) argues that this allows of course for the presence of conflicting frames, as for example “drug use” may be seen as a “public health issue” or as “criminal justice issue”.
1.2.1 Age of anxiety, culture of fear, risk society

The term “fear” plays an important role for many intellectual diagnoses of contemporary society. Furedi discusses the cultural foundations of an emerging “Politics of Fear”, strongly distinguishing it from an “age of anxiety”, which the 20th century has been labelled. Sunstein discusses similar phenomena, focusing on paralysing effects due to a mixture of a shortage and an overload of knowledge at the same time. Especially referring to technological innovations, this paradoxical situation can be illustrated precisely. Unquestionably, technological innovations will have more and different effects than just the ones they were designed for; but it is impossible to be aware of all consequences in advance. This is why Furedi claims that “further developments in the sphere of science and technology tend to be greeted with apprehension rather than celebration. So, for example, recent advances in genetics and nanotechnology are regarded as creating more problems than benefits to society”. This constellation of uncertain developments has replaced the attempts to theorise fear by risk analysis, which has, in any case, not delivered undisputed principles to handle “risky situations”.

If we transfer these thoughts about the societal perception of technologies in general to the field of surveillance technologies in particular, we find that one outcome of the climate of excessive fear and insecurity in the risk-society model is the public demand for extended systems of surveillance to “trace population movements in time and space” and to “risk-profile populations”. On the technological side, these demands can be well met: Nellis speaks of an “incessant oversight” that is possible via the satellite tracking of offenders, covering “any space in which people, objects or words move”. This goes together with how Spalek and Lambert describe late modern society, “defined by a continuous probing of beliefs, and increasing reflexivity, where ‘the deviant other is everywhere’ and ‘everyone is a potential deviant’”. Thus, we may find the following constellation highly influential for the deployment of new (surveillance) technologies:

Thus, we may find the following constellation highly influential for the deployment of new (surveillance) technologies:

46 Furedi, Frank, “The only thing we have to fear is the ‘culture of fear’ itself”, available on: http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?site/article/3053/
- a categorical mistrust of new technologies in general, caused by the assumption that not all of their effects can be controlled or even recognised “in time”;\textsuperscript{31}
- the technological capability of gathering all possible data, of every person, at any time and in any place;
- the conviction that surveillance should not focus only on already convicted offenders, but also and especially on potential offenders/suspects;
- the conviction that potential offenders might not be found only in routinely suspected areas of society, but throughout the entire civilian population.

This constellation creates a two-sided continuum of fear, in which the deployment of technologies takes shape. On the one side we observe a well known “fear of crime” and “fear of terrorism”, that demands all sorts of precautionary actions to reach a more effective and more efficient control of criminal activity. On the other side there arise fears on two different levels: at the individual level, the problem of an increased intrusion on privacy arises; on the societal level there are fears concerning more aggravated social inequality.

### 1.3 SOCIETAL RESILIENCE TO TERRORIST AND OTHER THREATS

Stepping back from the thrust of the argument above and its broad-brush, persuasive quality, it is important to note that societies are not fated to capitulate to the climate of fear described above, and that reactions to terrorism and crime vary, with variable policy or decision outcomes. Contemporary societies differ in the extent to which they are relaxed about perceived terrorist and other threats. This prompts questions about resilience and its meaning, to which this section contributes some groundwork, ending by posing some specific matters for possible further investigation.

Consider, first, the following episode in the Czech Republic:

Early one morning in June, 2007, a traditional programme on Czech TV’s second channel that offers long takes of Czech countryside, accompanied with weather information and elevator soundtrack, switched to a camera placed in a mountain resort in Krkonoše. Instead of seeing hazy pictures of the sleepy resort, many thousands of viewers were confronted with an unusually dynamic scene: a flash of light, followed by a spreading mushroom cloud, similar to an atomic bomb explosion. A ticker on the screen said ‘ztohoven.com’. An art collective, Ztohoven, hacked into the live TV broadcast as a part of their Media Reality project. The group later released a press statement declaring they were “neither a terrorist organization nor a political group. Our aim is not to intimidate society or manipulate it, which is something we witness on a daily basis both in the real world and in the one created by the media. On June 17 2007, [we] attacked the space of TV broadcasting, distorting it, questioning its truthfulness and its credibility.”

\textsuperscript{31}This more or less actively influenced process, of unknown or undesired effects emerging while the technology is already operating, or of new purposes being served by a technique, is often called “function creep”; see Lyon, David, \textit{Identifying Citizens: ID Cards as Surveillance}, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 58.
A criminal investigation was launched, and three of the group members were charged with spreading false information and faced a potential prison term of up to three years. After two years, all of members of Ztohoven were found not guilty and an administrative council later refused even to fine them for an administrative infraction.\(^{52}\) While Czech TV criticised the nuclear stunt of the group as “very inadvisable”, with a potential to provoke “panic among a wide group of people”, other reactions were more moderate. According to the New York Times, although “some Czechs expressed outrage over Ztohoven’s action ..., in general it drew a mild, tolerant, even amused public response, in contrast to how terrorism-related pranks, or what might seem like them, have been widely greeted elsewhere.”\(^{53}\)

Although any cross-societal comparison would be conjectural, how would such a prank have been likely to play on a morning weather show in Columbus, Ohio? Chan\(^{54}\) surveyed similar art projects in the US and Great Britain that provoked a substantially different reaction from the one in the Czech Republic, and concluded that “the ‘suspicious package’ has infiltrated our consciousness through government campaigns for citizens to take part in the war against terror”. For Ericson, “these artistic performances have raised awareness of the extent to which societies such as ours have become so steeped in suspicion that there is no room for discretion...So what is it about this ‘day and age’ that causes public art to be regarded as a ‘criminal activity’? Obviously, the political context of the ‘war on terror’ is central to the new culture of suspicion”.\(^{55}\)

The OECD report of 2003, *Emerging Systemic Risks in the 21st Century*, identified five major “risk clusters” that modern societies have to be prepared for: natural disasters, technological accidents, infectious diseases, terrorism-related risks, and food safety.\(^{56}\) All these threats are real; how societies react and respond to them, however, depends on a complex interaction of various factors, some of them real, some of them socially constructed. Resilience, or the “ability of a substance or object to spring back into shape”, gained prominence in security and crisis management studies after 2001.\(^{57}\) Sims opines that in the US homeland security realm, resilience is the word of the day.\(^{58}\) The UK Resilience website of the Cabinet Office defines its mission as to “reduce the risk from emergencies so that people can go about their

\(^{52}\) The Media reality project was later awarded NG333 prize by the National Gallery for “directness” in December, 2007.


\(^{57}\) Even Google's Ngram Viewer that reveals how often a word or phrase appears in books over time confirms this rise of prominence of the concept of resilience. See [http://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=resilience&year_start=1800&year_end=2008&corpus =0&smoothing=3](http://books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=resilience&year_start=1800&year_end=2008&corpus =0&smoothing=3)

business freely and with confidence" by providing contingency advice and guidance to the public and at every level to detect, prevent, and, if necessary, to handle and recover from disruptive challenges”. 59

The idea of resilience contrasts directly with prevention, in which the aim is to reduce risk to zero by preventing a threat from being realised. Existing research, unsurprisingly, offers a plethora of definitions of resilience that are influenced by respective fields in which it is conduced, ranging from engineering (from which the concept originates), technology and communications, to ecology, disaster research, psychology, sociology, geography, anthropology, to public health. All of them, however, include some variation on adaptability and the ability (of the individual or the system) to “bounce back”. As Vasu points out, “the elements constituting social resilience are multi faceted and the interaction of these elements with each other is frustratingly opaque. This is because these elements range from the psychological and social to the normative and also extend to the politics of both governance and culture”. 61

On the micro-level, research focuses on individuals and their responses to threats such as terrorist attacks. Kindt bases individual resilience on (1) individual characteristics (optimism, self-efficacy, mastery, and coherence); (2) social ties (that affect an individual’s access to resources and communal support); and (3) coping strategies and problem solving skills. 62 For Verleye et al., additional elements for a better conceptualisation of individual resilience are needed, including the presence of other major life stressors, perceived risk and fear, and mental distance from the ongoing terrorist threat. 63 A multidisciplinary approach combined with macro-level analysis of resilience informs a study by Norris et al. 64 Their theory of resilience encompasses contemporary understandings of stress, adaptation, wellness, and resource dynamics.

59 The Cabinet Office, “UK Resilience”, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/civil-contingencies/
60 Manyena argues strongly in favour of a process-oriented understanding of resilience, because “traditional practice of disaster management…has propensity to follow a paternalistic mode…Outcome-oriented disaster resilience programmes are inclined to adopt command and control styles that risk preserving the status quo, and which might entrench exclusion, and take attention away from the inequality, oppression and entitlement loss that results in cases of proneness to insecurity and disaster.” For more see: Manyena, S. Bernard, “The concept of resilience revisited”, Disasters, Vol. 30, 2006, pp. 433-450.
63 Verleye, Gino, Pieter Maeseele, Isabelle Stevens and Anne Speckhard, “Resilience in an Age of Terrorism: Psychology, Media and Communication”, in M. Brooke Rogers, Christopher A. Lewis, Kate M. Loewenthal, R. Amlot and Marco Cinnirella, (eds.) Aspects of Terrorism and Martyrdom: Dying for God, Dying for Good. The Edwin Mellin Press, Lampeter, 2009. Some researchers offer practical recommendations. Flynn argues that every individual American will have to take responsibility for their own resilience, taking relatively easy steps that include buying a three-day emergency kit; developing a family emergency contact plan; and visiting websites maintained by the Red Cross and other organizations: “such efforts can provide real peace of mind and save lives when disaster strikes.” See: Flynn, Stephen E., “America the Resilient”, Foreign Affairs, Volume 87, No. 2, 2008, pp. 2-8, p. 8.
It is process-oriented, constructed as a linkage of a network of adaptive capacities (resources with dynamic attributes) to adaptation after a disturbance or adversity. These capacities (economic development, social capital, information and communication, and community competence) together provide a strategy for disaster readiness.

It is obvious that the concept of resilience has inspirational qualities and is often used in this manner, either in political speeches, official policy documents, and even in award recognition of outstanding efforts in crisis: it is better to be thought resilient than brittle and susceptible to fracture. It is open to discussion whether resilience brings a qualitatively new approach to governance. One may imagine that, for Ericson, resilience may be no more than a new spin on the politics of uncertainty that supplemented traditional risk management and led to the institutionalisation of precautionary logics and crime control. Even for Norris et al. “there is something to be said for viewing [resilience] as an inevitable, inherent, universal quality of the human spirit ... Communities with high rates of post-traumatic stress disorder or substance abuse or domestic violence or child maltreatment cannot be said to be well. If these or similarly severe problems emerge and persist in the aftermath of a disaster, the community has not exhibited resilience”.

Two broad points emerge from the discussion in this chapter. First, how events are transformed into crises is in large part due to social construction. It is the “process by which some insecurities are perceived as dire and others inconsequential, some as the domain of the state and others the responsibility of individuals...” It is the media that

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65 Adaptation “is manifest in population wellness, defined as high and non-disparate levels of mental and behavioral health, functioning, and quality of life”; see Norris, Fran H., Susan P. Stevens, Betty Pfefferbaum, Karen F. Wyche and Rose L. Pfefferbaum, “Community resilience as a metaphor, theory, set of capacities, and strategy for disaster readiness”, American Journal of Community Psychology, Vol. 41, 2008, pp. 132-134.


67 Department of Homeland Security announced in 2012 the creation of The Rick Rescorla National Award for Resilience to recognise “outstanding response to a catastrophic incident and leadership in fostering resilient and prepared communities”. See “Secretary Napolitano Announces The Creation Of The Rick Rescorla National Award For Resilience”, http://www.dhs.gov/news/2012/03/27/secretary-napolitano-announces-creation-rick-rescorla-national-award-resilience. UK Resilience web offers, as a part of community resilience section, an awards helpsheet that was developed “if you wish to recognise a community member who has engaged with resilience and recovery work”, http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/community-resilience-awards


have "a central role in creating and modulating crises". To Roberts, “perceptions of the significance of crises, and the obligations of governments in relation to crises, are largely shaped by the structure of the infosphere. [That] has changed radically in the last three decades.” Moreover, the media-driven amplification of crises allows terrorists, for example, “to reach civilians far removed from the actual attack who are then psychologically victimized by it – suffering from anxiety and terror that they too can become victims”. In this sense, terrorism is “nowadays essentially a media experienced phenomena [sic] versus actual experience”. But a cautionary note is that not all crises are manufactured by either the media or other special interests, and not all events are amplified into crises or panics. How the public can distinguish between threats that are real and those that are invented, and how public policy can respond in this climate of uncertainty, are questions of prime importance on both the explanatory and policy levels.

Second, and to complicate matters more, our reactions to crisis are constituted and shaped by cultural assumptions and political conditions. While all the concepts that define resilience are universal and relevant in every society, “the manifestations and collaterals of these constructs are undoubtedly culture-specific” and may “vary substantially across cultures”. An essential part of resilience-building entails introduction, implementation or strengthening of surveillance to address (in)security. This opens several interesting questions that would be worth exploring beyond the scope of this Task:

How are different types of risk clusters interlinked with surveillance?
How easily do policy solutions that target societal resilience transfer from country to country?
How big is the “resilience-building” spillover to other public policies?

76 For an extensive critique of the culture of fear, the expansion of surveillance and the neoliberal policy shift that produce public-private collusion, see Monahan, Torin, Surveillance in the Time of Insecurity. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, NJ, 2010. His argument is that these phenomena are mutually constitutive, producing public-private partnerships collusion and the distribution of responsibility for security to individual citizen.
Does public support for (increased) surveillance differ between countries that have recently experienced events that have tested resilience and those with limited or no such recent experience?

How path-dependent are the adaptive capacities of former communist societies that spent decades under threats ranging from the “enemy within”, that gave rise to omnipresent state service (e.g., Stasi, KGB, STB, Securitate), to the ever-present threat of global nuclear conflict, to nuclear disaster (e.g., Chernobyl in 1986)?

1.4 EXPERIENCING SURVEILLANCE IN DIFFERENT DEMOCRATIC CONTEXTS, INCLUDING NEW DEMOCRACIES AND FORMER REPRESSIVE REGIMES

The numerous forms of surveillance, especially those concerning the relationship between the citizens and the state, are realised and experienced differently in different democratic contexts. This concerns not only the present political and social systems but also previous systems, that is, the legacy of the former repressive regimes in the so-called new democracies. The historical experience of present-day democracies has a significant influence on how citizens react to and cope with surveillance. Haggerty and Samatas claim that surveillance at the surface seems to be antagonistic to democracy, and ultimately leads to totalitarianism. However, surveillance – even in its institutionalised forms – is a legitimate element of democratic systems as well. The fundamental difference between dictatorial and democratic systems with regard to surveillance lies in its accountability: while in a dictatorial system state surveillance cannot be overseen and controlled by the citizens, at least in an institutionalized form, in democracies there are institutions and mechanisms established for this purpose (although in practice such systems cannot be easily overseen and controlled either). In addition, in a democratic constitutional state, a precondition of legitimate surveillance is that it must have a morally acceptable ground (although most repressive regimes justify surveillance by declaring moral principles, for example, to protect the country and its citizens from harmful influence). Apart from theoretical dilemmas – for example, which countries can be regarded as democracies, and whether a democracy can be regarded as “democratic” in every respect – the borderline between “democratic” and “dictatorial” surveillance is not clear-cut. For example, the current shifts from Foucault’s panoptic society to today’s control or actuarial societies, from the old penology to “New Penology”, and from “new” surveillance technologies to “future and emerging” technologies (FETs) serving ubiquitous, “predictive” surveillance, can be observed in a wide range of systems on the normative continuum. Of course, the final aim of surveillance is different, in dictatorial systems, in which – governed by the idea of centralisation – it serves the interests of a much narrower political elite than in democracies. The differences in the nature of surveillance in the different democratic contexts, however, can best be detected in “classic”, institutionalised state surveillance, exercised by specific institutions and agents, serving political and ideological purposes; therefore we concentrate on this kind of surveillance in the following sections. However, we do not focus upon the dichotomy

of democratic and repressive regimes, but rather on different democratic contexts, with special regard to new democracies or former repressive regimes.

1.4.1 Surveillance practices in repressive regimes

Throughout history, numerous repressive regimes had built surveillance networks and institutions against their citizens. Our approach in 21st century Europe has been shaped perhaps the most by the practice of 20th century dictatorial systems. Here we should consider not only the countries of the former Soviet Bloc but also what had been well-established democracies in Western Europe, both in the interwar period and after World War Two. Although the activity of the secret police of Nazi Germany and its allies is a well-known topic among surveillance historians, similar to the attempts to set up a totalitarian-style citizen registration, the realisation of the ultimate Überwachungsstaat (“surveillance state”) is best perceived in post-war East Germany, in the Soviet Union, and in and its satellite states. This is due not only to Orwell’s accurate and merciless vision publicised as early as the late 1940s, but in a sense also to the historical remorse of Western European countries, the pre- and post-war surveillance practices of which were indirectly legitimised by the ideology of the Soviet system.

The organisations specialised for keeping citizens – potential “internal enemies of the system” – under surveillance in countries of the Soviet Bloc were the KGB in the Soviet Union, Stasi in East Germany, STB in Czechoslovakia, Securitate in Romania, or the "III/III Division" in Hungary. They followed similar ideologies and performed similar tasks; however, national and cultural differences were not negligible. As a US scholar who had been doing research in Socialist Romania for 25 years recalled, the surveillance practice (and its deficiencies) of the Securitate demonstrated the weakness of the system rather than its strength. In contrast, the far-flung activities and precision of the Stasi can be demonstrated by the personal story of a Canadian professor, who had visited East German archives and co-operatives several times, and – as it turned out after 1989 – had been registered by the Stasi many years before he would have even thought of visiting the country. The effects these state-controlled surveillance practices had on society, however, were similar. As Szekely describes, “By keeping the ‘internal enemies’ of the system under surveillance, the secret services and their civilian collaborators perpetuated a situation in which no one could be sure just how much the next person knew about him or her. This constant sense of doubt and distrust massively disfigured human relationships on both the personal and the social levels.”

78 For example, the alleged collaboration of the IBM with the Nazi regime in the 1993 German census, which identified Jews in the population of Germany; see Black, Edwin, IBM and the Holocaust, Little Brown, Boston, MA, 2001.
79 Animal Farm was first published in 1945, 1984 in 1949.
81 Information courtesy of Professor Scott M. Eddie, University of Toronto.
statements of the famous 1983 census decision of the German Constitutional Court, which reads: “...whoever cannot measure the knowledge of possible communication partners to any degree, can be fundamentally limited in his personal freedom...”.  

Although in Europe the Soviet political system was regarded as the emblematic example of the surveillance state, in the same period of the 20th century several Southern European countries suffered from dictatorial regimes, which also had extensive, state-controlled surveillance systems.\(^{84}\) In Spain and Portugal, dictatorial regimes occupied a significant part of the last century – ending only in 1975 and 1974, respectively – and both established their organisations responsible for keeping the civilian population under surveillance (TOP and SECED in Spain, PIDE in Portugal). In the relatively short historical period of dictatorship in Italy, the Mussolini regime had built up its Organisation for Vigilance and Repression of Anti-Fascism (Ovra) already by the end of the 1920s. Greece had a short military dictatorship but a long period of post-war repressive political regime. These regimes and their surveillance systems relied on networks of informants and centralised filing systems, first spying on communists and anti-fascists, later on “all aspects of national life”.\(^ {85}\)

This characteristic of state-controlled surveillance systems seems to be universal: in other continents and cultures, the respective surveillance organisations set up similar networks and applied similar means, including the activities of “private collaborators”. During the 1973-1990 military rule in Chile, for example, one of the pillars of the regime was the surveillance activities of the secret police, the DINA, which, in collaboration with the foreign department, extended its operation to other countries, too, where opposition Chileans were living.\(^ {86}\) Similar practice can be observed in other Latin American countries during repressive political regimes. 

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\(^{84}\) The Living in Surveillance Societies (LiSS) COST Action, a four-year European research program supported by the European Commission, devoted its annual international conference held in Iasi, Romania in 2011 to the theme of surveillance in post-dictatorial societies. The proceedings of the conference have been published as Webster, William C., Doina Balahur, Nils Zurawski, Kees Boersma, Bence Ságvári and Christel Backman (eds.), Living in Surveillance Societies: The Ghosts of Surveillance. Proceedings of LiSS Conference 2, Editura Universităţii „Alexandru Ioan Cuza”, Iasi, 2011.


Resistance or resilience towards such state-controlled surveillance can take several forms. As Los emphasises, people in communist regimes developed a strong control over their body language in order to produce a uniform appearance and mask their opinions. The expression “Not over the phone!” was widely used both in its actual and symbolic meanings. Opposition intellectuals tried to reduce their constant stress by publicly and privately joking about the ubiquitous surveillance, for example, talking into the light switch on the wall as if it were a microphone (and sometimes it really was). Inverse surveillance was extremely rare and dangerous to conduct in these political systems.

1.4.2 Surveillance and the change of political systems

In the turbulent periods of profound change of these political systems, the surveillance practice of the previous regime and the dossiers of citizens earlier regarded as “internal enemies” has gained special significance, both in politics and in public opinion. One of the principal political demands in such periods has concerned the accessibility of these dossiers; this has often become symbolic of the changes. Similarly, in the eyes of the public, agents and spies who performed surveillance against the citizens have easily become scapegoats responsible for all the wrongdoings of the past regime. In order to handle this problem of a partly legal, partly moral nature, countries undergoing such system change have been seeking various solutions, including legal ones, and have created various versions of instruments for “lustration”, which is explained below. Although not a European specificity, lustration can be analysed most comprehensively in the practice of new European democracies.

In essence, lustration has three main functions: (a) screening the past of former agents and collaborators and filtering them out from present political life; (b) showing how the system was working, thereby offering an informational recompense to the society; and (c) providing access for the individual subjects of surveillance to their dossiers, i.e., guaranteeing their informational self-determination. The first element is of a sanctioning character, the second is that of a collective right, while the third is guaranteeing an individual right to the persons concerned. In practice, the newly democratic regimes have laid different emphases on each of these functions, thereby creating national versions of lustration. At the two ends of the spectrum are the German and the Hungarian solutions: in Germany, the identity of the agents and informants became publicly known and those found guilty were prevented from fulfilling public functions, while in Hungary agents could resign from their functions in public life on the quiet, and if they wanted to stay, the greatest sanction was the public exposure of their past.

88 Photos taken by opposition activists in Prague and Budapest of secret police agents during their clandestine actions was exhibited in the OSA Archivum in early 2011 as one of the few examples of inverse surveillance during communism; see: http://osaarchivum.org/galeria/catalogue/2011/surveillance/index.html
Despite the sublime ideas and the few cathartic public events – such as the so-called Hungarian Watergate, or Duna-gate scandal,\textsuperscript{89} when a renegade intelligence officer of the infamous III/III Division ended up in front of the television cameras making a public confession – lustration proved to be an imperfect tool for revealing the surveillance practice of the past regimes and became the arena of political struggles, blackmailing, and falsifying documentary evidence. It deserves noting that the old secret services did not stop conducting their surveillance activities even during the turbulent periods of profound political changes, although in some cases this could be regarded as the aimless and dysfunctional reflex of an apparatus left to its own devices.

1.4.3 Public perceptions of surveillance in post-dictatorial systems

It is not surprising that the impact of surveillance practice of repressive regimes lasts longer than the regimes themselves. This is partly due to the unsolved problems, such as lustration, after the political changes, and partly due to the long life and inheritable nature of patterns of resistance and resilience towards surveillance. A further important factor is the role of former agents and collaborators in the new political era: one part of them remained in the bonds of newly democratised secret services – although the elderly or discredited members of the old guard have been replaced –, another part entered in the newly booming private security and investigating business, which absorbed a significant proportion of the personnel and knowledge of the former surveillance organisations; again another part succeeded in transforming their power and networks into other sectors of the political or business elite. According to Los, in the former communist countries the surviving secret knowledge made it difficult to institutionalise any form of accountability.\textsuperscript{90}

As Los also points out,\textsuperscript{91} a decisive factor was the conversion of fear: the pervasive fear of the repressive regime and its institutions and agents was quickly replaced by a fear of crime – and we can add that this did not only create a demand for the new security industry, but also created a basis for the legitimacy of maintaining, and even increasing, the level of surveillance in general. Naturally, fear of crime as the basis for the legitimacy of surveillance is not a post-communist characteristic: in South Africa, for example, there was no need to convert the fear of the state to the fear of crime: the level of crime had always been high and constituted a continuous basis for the legitimacy of surveillance, while in the UK apparently crime and the fear of crime have been decisive factors for applying CCTV cameras on a wide scale.

The surviving patterns of (real or counterfeit) conformity towards the ruling political system may also have a role in the popularity of clichés like “if you have done nothing wrong or have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear” in some new democracies. According the Szekely,\textsuperscript{92} in these societies the threshold of abstraction


\textsuperscript{91} Los, Maria, “Post-communist fear of crime and the commercialization of security”, \textit{Theoretical Criminology}, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2002.

(above which people do not realise the intrusion in their privacy)\textsuperscript{93} is lower in this area than in more experienced democracies. A further general conclusion by Los is that societies experiencing the prolonged dictatorships of the 20th century virtually skipped the period of (democratic) modernity and jumped directly into the surveillance culture of postmodernity, which renders obsolete any unified concept of the self. Combined with the cultural consequences of globalisation and the rapid development of technology, the lack of historical experience in adaptation to new, decentralised forms of surveillance makes the disintegrating personality even more vulnerable in such new democracies. This seems to resonate at another level – the level of everyday practice – with Szekely's observation, according to which the members of these societies are less experienced and more gullible vis-à-vis business and marketing offers, including industry-driven surveillance.\textsuperscript{94}

Differences in national history also constitute an important factor in the present-day perception of surveillance in post-dictatorial societies. In Greece, decades after the collapse of the dictatorship, there remains a deep mistrust of any state or police surveillance even for legitimate purposes (such as traffic control, etc.), while citizens are conspicuously uninterested in private surveillance and data collection. Watching is less important than filing; these characteristics are sometimes called the “Greek surveillance paradox”.\textsuperscript{95} In Italy, the discretionary powers and a lack of radical reform of the police until recent times have emphasised the socio-cultural legacy of the dictatorship and have led to the consideration of surveillance practices as integral to the security apparatus of public bodies and private organisations.\textsuperscript{96} In Portugal, it is not the aim of securitising the country, but a pattern of developmental policies that led to the widespread use of CCTV cameras and related equipment: gaining competitiveness, using new technologies, “recovering the lost time” are major driving forces behind a new culture of surveillance.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{93} According to this hypothesis, it is not the violation of privacy in itself that counts but its perceptibility: the more abstract, the less important, no matter how grave the violation is. In Szekely's example, if policemen stop people frequently and ask for their ID cards, people soon protest against the “police state”, however, if the same policemen check the same people without stopping them, probably nobody objects.


Temporal changes in the perception of surveillance, and in general in the respect for rights and liberties, show a typical pattern in societies undergoing transition from dictatorship. In the initial euphoria, the new rights and freedoms, including information rights, have a high respect in society, are publicised in the media, and constitute an important element of the political agenda. However, when the euphoric elation and the momentum of metamorphosis is spent, career, profit, business, and political power all take precedence over respect for individual rights. This is especially true for the new, much more technocratic generation, which has grown up since the political changes began. These temporal changes significantly influence the public perception of surveillance in the different historical periods. Taking all the above factors into consideration, it is still questionable whether and when a new surveillance culture mixing a seductive menu-culture – as Los puts it – with a belligerent securitisation culture will supersede the differences of the political biographies of “old” and “new” democracies.

1.4.4 Closing remarks on democracy and non-democratic surveillance

Although it is not the task of this section to analyse the legitimacy of the surveillance practice in today's democratic countries, we should note that there exists no “ideal” version of democracy, only different realisations of democratic ideals in different political and cultural environments. There are political systems that are formally democratic, but there is much room for criticism of the way power is exercised, or of the practical realisation of democratic rules of game. For example, in the past, the Soviet Union introduced the so-called “democratic centralism” (which was rather more centralism than democratic), and the post-civil war Greek system can be described as a semi-parliamentary, “guided democracy” (in reality, an oppressive anti-Communist socio-political control system). The different Western European democratic traditions have also resulted in national or regional specificities, even under the umbrella of the EU – which can also be regarded as an autonomous system in itself – not to mention the approaches of other geopolitical regions and cultures. The new European democracies did not adopt a uniform democratic system either; the differing historical experiences, the geo-political and cultural regions and the longue durée societal processes all have had an impact on the versions of democracy these countries are trying to realise.

Consequently, the national modalities of surveillance systems are oriented to different ideas and perceptions, despite the strong trends of globalisation. However, if there existed an ideal democracy, present-day surveillance practice would trespass its borderlines in many respects, as empirical evidence and experience shows. This sets a difficult task both for researchers in surveillance studies and for committed democrats, as well as for the law enforcement sector, the members of which have

always regarded individual rights as a disturbing factor in the work they are entrusted with in the great division of labour in society, and the efficiency and importance of which they deeply believe in. Similarly much burden is placed on those “applied” philosophers and ideologists whose task is to prove the democratic, constitutional nature of present-day surveillance.

1.5 THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF FEAR AND INSECURITY

We have already considered the question of resilience in the face of real or supposed threats. Previous sections have set the scene for looking at some of the political repercussions of the climate of fear and insecurity. The present section considers these briefly in terms of the effect on decision-making and political debate, as a precursor to the lengthier discussion of policy-making and the regulation of surveillance, which form the substance of Chapter 2.

1.5.1 The distortion of debate and decision

Security and insecurity have been important in the policy discourse for a long time. In 1994, Rudolph Giuliani won the election to become the Mayor of New York on the promise of implementing a “tough on crime” approach at a time when insecurity was high in the public agenda. Since the 2001 attack on the Twin Towers, security concerns have incorporated the terrorist threat, and fear has become a fixed item in public discourse. This pressure to act, react and prevent, to respond to people's fears and sense of insecurity, affects the policy process in significant ways, as people demand to see that something is being done to protect them. As Bruce Schneier explains, this results in an increasing recourse to what he calls “security theatre”: “a cheaper alternative to real security”, a set of “palliative” measures that “provide the feeling of security instead of the reality”.100 This can be due to several reasons, but for the issue of debate and decision-making, security theatre provides a fast, visible and effective (theatrical) way to show that “something is being done” about insecurity. In their study on the growth of CCTV, one of the most visible responses to insecurity in urban areas, Norris et al. emphasise the way in which “the political appeal of CCTV has less to do with CCTV’s proven effectiveness in reducing crime and far more to do with its symbolic value that something was being done about the problem of crime’.101

In the field of security policy, thus, there has been an increasing departure from statistics and other forms of evidence that can be amenable to scientific analysis and challenge, and a growing reliance on feelings and perceptions, as Svenonius observes.102 This focus on people’s perception of insecurity as “evidence” is one of the drivers behind the increasing reliance on surveillance technology in security policy, together with the fact that relying on privately-provided technological solutions is a good fit to the commercial logic so pervasive in 21st-century urban management. In this context, however, what does and does not constitute a threat ends

up being decided by a combination of media-amplified panics (discussed earlier) rushed public debates, commercial self-interest and political pressure.

Assessing the effectiveness or cost-efficiency of surveillance and security policies and technologies is not a priority in this environment; nor is the search for more subtle, less dramatic alternative policies. But even when evaluations emerge to show that some of the policy decisions taken to combat crime and the fear of crime through surveillance technologies do not work, or do not work sufficiently well to justify the policy and expenditure, these are usually not revised. As Norris et al. argue in relation to CCTV, we must look beyond efficiency “to explain the explosive growth of CCTV surveillance, and these [other reasons] include the common sense notion that it must work, its popularity with the public, the Government’s need to be seen to be doing something about crime and the publicity surrounding CCTV in high profile cases”.

Debate and rational, accountable decision-making suffer in a climate of fear and of a deterministic perspective on technology, and the necessary relationship between public problems and policy solutions – key to good policy-making – risks being lost. Moreover, negative externalities related to the political, social and economic cost of such policies are often overlooked, as the chosen policy solutions are not assessed in relation to their potentially less harmful or costly alternatives. A pertinent case in point here is aviation security. Since the 9/11 attacks, using hijacked aircraft, aviation security has become a priority in the whole world, and anti-terrorist, surveillance practices have become a common feature of air travel. However, there is little evidence available about the usefulness and proportionality of cost-effectiveness of such measures, and the relationship between the security problems that emerge and the technological solutions that are implemented as a result is often obscure and sheltered from public or political debate.

On Christmas Day 2010, for instance, a person was arrested after attempting to explode a device sewn to his underwear on an Amsterdam-Detroit Northwest Airlines flight. The perpetrator had previously raised suspicion with the UK Border Agency and British intelligence, and his own father had reported him to the US embassy in Abuja (Nigeria) for his religious extremism. He was therefore added to several databases in the US and the UK, but the information was neither shared nor investigated further; thus he managed to board a plane in Amsterdam, even though he eventually failed to detonate the explosives he was carrying. From a policy perspective, one of the obvious diagnoses of “what went wrong” would point to the use of databases and the inefficiency of intelligence to address reported cases in a fast and effective manner. A coherent solution would need to address these shortcomings. In the days after the event, however, most headlines shifted the focus: “Detroit terror attack: pressure grows for full body scanners at British airports”, said The Telegraph on December 30th, 2010. The fact that it was unclear whether such devices would have identified the explosives the man was carrying seemed irrelevant, and this event marked the beginning of the proliferation of full-body scanners at airports across the globe, arguably infringing passengers’ rights and substantially affecting air travel.

even though the link between the actual threat and the adopted solution remains
difficult to establish.

The problem does not only lie with the possibility of having an informed debate over
surveillance solutions to security problems, but also on the possibility of making the
decision-making process dependent on evaluation of their negative externalities and
cost-effectiveness. The preventive law enforcement agenda put forward after 9/11 has
resulted in increased surveillance powers for public and private bodies alike, and an

All this has implications for people's rights and civil liberties. But a key element that
is often overlooked when addressing this issue is the fact that, as observed with
CCTV, the tools to monitor the efficacy of such policy decisions and alter them if
proven deficient or not proportional are rarely used, and the drive toward security
seems to justify unaccountable decision-making and policy.
2. CHAPTER 2: SURVEILLANCE AS A TOOL THAT IS SUBJECT TO REGULATION, LIMITATION AND CONTROL

We subscribe to the view that surveillance can – albeit with difficulty, and with considerable variation across jurisdictions, levels of jurisdiction, and types of surveillance – be brought within the limits expected in democratic, accountable political systems governed by the rule of law. In this chapter, we therefore turn to examine policy-making for surveillance, both how surveillance is put on a legitimate footing and how it can be kept in bounds through the actions of political and governmental systems. Our discussion of policy-making is illustrated with the case of data retention, a policy subject that has been greatly controversial in the EU and between it and third countries in recent years. We investigate accountability and transparency as central norms of democratic, non-authoritarian political systems, norms that also play their part in the control of surveillance whether the latter is deployed by organisations in the public or private sector. The rule of law, and the position of rights and freedoms as criteria for evaluating surveillance, is also discussed, while the governance of surveillance is described in terms of the repertory of instruments and actors that expand the possibilities beyond the enactment, implementation and adjudication of statutory law or other legal provisions. Our account of the political perspective, and of the processes, organisations and actors that play important parts in countering surveillance, acknowledges the important role of everyday individual resistance to surveillance, which was discussed in Deliverable 2.1. This can be seen as a response that has political significance separate from the activities of more formal activist or protest groups and organisations that aim to influence policy through the better recognised channels of a democratic political system.

2.1 POLICY-MAKING AND SURVEILLANCE

Decision-making is an integral part of policy. For policy solutions to be implemented, problems have to be defined, decisions need to be made and resources must be found and allocated. For a long time, policy-making was seen and explained in some textbooks as a rational exercise carried out by rational actors working logically and scientifically in perfect information settings, where decision-makers would pick up on the issues that emerged from the public debate and find the best possible solution. As we emphasise in this chapter, this idea has long been overcome by a complex, more empirically based, multifaceted and less-than-perfect understanding of policy and decision-making. The role of uncertainty, ambiguity and the impact of competition between actors and interests must be acknowledged. This complex understanding has made it much easier for policy analysts to take account of the many processes that can be identified in policy-making, although it is daunting to gathering empirical data on the phenomena that are involved in policy-making, whether in general or in specific areas such as surveillance.

There are a number of ways of conceiving what is meant by the very term “policy-making”, and academic literature in political science and public policy has brought forward a number of approaches and models that are intended to help understand the public policy-making process. Useful approaches include the “policy cycles”,107 “policy networks”,108 and “policy streams”109 approaches, as well as models that focus on the processes of decision-making.110 Policy-making can also be conceived as a “practice”: the art of policy-making,111 or as an activity that is closely related to, and not distinct from, service delivery and strategy. Implicit in policy-oriented approaches are ideas that policy-making involves the making of decisions or the setting of a direction, especially in relation to public services and/or regulation. Policy-making is therefore also closely aligned to the legitimacy of the political and democratic systems and the rationality of individual policies.

Policy-making, in whatever field of activity and under whatever definition, is inherently complex. It involves a wide range of actors, organisations and institutions, as well as relationships and discourses. Moreover, this constellation moves through time, often in recursive loops and with a kaleidoscopically shifting array of participants, ideas and outputs. Policy-making, for example in relation to surveillance, can best be understood from two key perspectives, first as the processes that lead to emergence of surveillance policy, and second as the content of policy relating to surveillance. Although these two perspectives are interrelated, they are recognised in general policy studies as distinctive schools of research.112 Together, they underline the importance of understanding what constitutes a surveillance policy, who is formally responsible for determining it, how the policy emerges, which actors, institutions and discourses influence and shape the policy-making process, and what relationships and vested interests are central to the development of the policy. They also involve an investigation of policy rationales, substance, and effects. Therefore, they analyse and evaluate a policy as well as comment upon its procedural aspects, including the extent to which a policy conforms to democratic values and processes. In the case of surveillance, many processes are covert – perhaps necessarily – and emerge from within relatively closed circles of actors and institutions, and not always

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112 John, Peter, Analysing Public Policy, Pinter, London, 1998.
specifically endorsed through democratic, representative bodies. This makes it difficult to study surveillance policy thoroughly in terms of process, and to evaluate it in terms of content and effect.

2.1.1 Policy-making processes

A process perspective on policy-making uses a number of theories and approaches. It identifies and considers all the actors and organisations in a policy system and how the system turns policy inputs into policy activity and outcomes. Within the overall system, policy theorists often point to a number of “stages” within a policy “cycle”, starting with policy formation and ending with policy implementation and evaluation. This is a useful set of analytical concepts, although the assumption of a linear or temporal sequence is arguable not often warranted. Nevertheless, by breaking the process down into a number of conceptual stages it is possible to organise empirical data about the actors and institutions that are active and influential at which stage in the policy cycle. In this way it becomes possible to identify organisations formally involved in developing public policy, such as governments, parliaments and other public agencies, and also the emergence of interests, groups and networks, which may seek to shape the policy-making process to their advantage. Policy-making in this perspective is less about the content of policy and more about the negotiated processes by which policy content emerges.

Policy-oriented approaches to understanding policy-making emphasise the significance of the processes by which policies emerge and are implemented. The “policy process” is usually understood to mean the methods, strategies, techniques and (non-) decisions taken by actors or a group of actors to develop and implant a policy. The policy process incorporates a range of complex relationships between actors, actions, institutions and discourses that combine to create policy output. For Ham and Hill, the focus on policy process necessarily emphasises “the stages through which issues pass… (and where)...attempts are made to assess the influence of different factors on the development of the issues. Studies of the policy process invariably show concern with policy content, but in the main they are interested in uncovering the main influences on policy formation”. Studies of the policy process

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are therefore largely concerned with the way policy emerges and advances over time, and with trying to understand the various forces and influences that shape policy advancement. A policy-process perspective is useful because it can help explain why one policy emerges and another does not. It also illuminates power structures, institutional processes, vested interests and influential actors in a process that is messy, complex and sometimes apparently irrational.

The most sophisticated process accounts of policy-making suggest that policy processes are not autonomous phenomena but are inextricably linked to pre-existing political, social and economic arrangements in which policy-makers operate. In this perspective, ‘social structure’ influences and constrains the development of policy and policy emerges as a result of wider socio-economic forces in society. Similarly, ‘ideas’ or ‘discourse’ approaches to policy-making emphasise the importance of the creation and sharing of knowledge in and around policy processes, and that policy-making takes place in the context of discourse, debate, dispute and discussion about different ideas and beliefs. Ideas influence policy development by acting as ‘road maps’ to help actors determine their own preferences, by alleviating policy problems by providing acceptable policy solutions and by encouraging habitual, routine behaviour.

The focus on ideas and discourse highlights the role played by the media in contemporary policy-making processes. Henschel argues that the media plays a crucial role in defining problems and in constructing political and policy agendas. As was suggested earlier in Task 2.2, this is because the media often sensationalises and amplifies certain issues and uses language that shapes our perception of an issue. In this respect, representations of surveillance in the media play an important role in the policy process, for example in the importance of realising national security. A number of authors have argued that whilst the media undoubtedly has a role in shaping policy agendas and hence policy outcomes, policy-makers and politicians use the media themselves to shape public opinion and consequentially mediate the development of a preferred policy.

In relation to surveillance, the policy-process approach alerts us to consider the roles played by various actors in the public policy-making process, including those

formally charged with determining policy content, but significantly also those involved in shaping the process and those who have a vested interest in the development of policy. This would include official government and public agencies, politicians, the media, and also companies that manufacture, supply and maintain surveillance systems, the latter including the military and large multinational defence companies. The combination of these vested interests has been referred to as the “surveillance industrial complex”, the “political economy of surveillance”, and organisations contributing to “surveillance assemblages”. Additionally, the process approach encourages us to consider the roles played by language, discourse and those who seek to shape public opinion and understanding. In this respect, representations of surveillance in the media play an important role in the policy process, for example in the importance of realising national security.

2.1.2 Surveillance policy

In terms of the content of policy, despite the prevalence of technologically mediated surveillance practices in everyday life, it is very rare for an explicit “surveillance policy” to exist, although we can identify decisions to put surveillance into practice and to use specific technologies. This is not to imply that surveillance is never a discrete policy area; rather, that it is the subject of policy in a range of different policy areas or settings, from national defence to transport and community safety, and at different jurisdictional levels from the local to the global. Later on, we focus upon data retention as an illustration of recent policy-making in the field of surveillance.

Within the policy studies literature, it is recognised that there does not necessarily have to be a written policy for a policy to exist. Instead a policy can be “course of action” arising from a series of intended activities or even as the unintended outcome of activities that are nonetheless carried out in the administration and implementation of services. In this respect, the development of surveillance policy is subtle and multi-layered, possibly through the aggregation of individual decisions without an overarching and deliberate “policy”. In the absence of a dedicated, overall surveillance policy, a key issue to consider is which policy environments are relevant to the development of surveillance and how the aim of surveillance varies across them. Typically, it is assumed that policy relating to surveillance would include national and local security, where surveillance technologies and systems are developed and deployed as part of explicit defence, intelligence and security.

policies.\textsuperscript{130} This takes place at international, national and local policy-making levels. For example, in the Stockholm Programme,\textsuperscript{131} surveillance is explicitly part of the policy area and the implementation of European security systems. Surveillance as a policy area can also be assumed to be part of national defence and security in that it forms part of the arsenal of techniques used for counter terrorism, intelligence gathering and national security, and as a central feature in the development of technologies and policy that involve explicit surveillance technologies, such as the UK national CCTV strategy.\textsuperscript{132} At the local level, surveillance may form part of local strategies for service delivery, especially in relation to community safety and the deterrence of criminal and undesirable behaviour.\textsuperscript{133} At any level, eyes, ears and brains still remain useful “technologies” of surveillance.

Beyond the domain of security and safety, surveillance technologies and practices have entered a range of other policy arenas and service environments. Explicit surveillance systems are evident in transport\textsuperscript{134} and education\textsuperscript{135} settings, as well as at large-scale events,\textsuperscript{136} such as the quadrennial Olympic Games. This is especially the case in relation to video surveillance cameras, which have diffused into a wide range of public-service settings.\textsuperscript{137} A more nuanced understanding of surveillance would include a range of technological database systems used in the provision of “eGovernment”, where surveillance practices are implicit and relate more specifically to the exchange of personal information required for service delivery.\textsuperscript{138} In that understanding, surveillance is embedded as part of the processes involved in the use of new technologies for service provision, and as such is part of many policy areas. The point emerging from these considerations is that the involvement of these systems and practices can be taken as evidence of the kind of deliberate activity, including the allocation of resources, that is usually comprehended within the scope of studies of policy-making. As such, questions of accountability, transparency, and

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legitimacy apply to surveillance policy just as much as in other policy areas, even if these evaluative criteria yield different answers in the case of surveillance. In democratic regimes, there is therefore a tension between surveillance and the values in terms of which such political systems typically like to be measured.

This perspective on surveillance, which incorporates those practices and technologies that collect and process personal information, makes data protection and privacy key surveillance policy-making areas. Policy-making in these areas is well established, and within Europe, takes place at the EU and national levels.\(^{139}\) At the EU level, this includes the Article 29 Working Party,\(^{140}\) the institutions of the European Union, and pieces of legislation such as the 1995 European Directive on Data Protection. At the national level, policy-making content includes the development of national legislation and regulation (for example, the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA) in the UK) and the creation of an agency responsible for data protection policy and regulation (for example, in the UK, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)). In the UK, under the DPA and other legislation including the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000, there is a cluster of regulators in the surveillance field besides the ICO: an Interim CCTV Regulator, and Interception of Communications Commissioner, and a Chief Surveillance Commissioner. This somewhat confused bundle of activity and responsibility for has been called into question,\(^{141}\) and there are moves afoot to create a “strategy for a more joined up approach to the regulation of surveillance which impacts on personal privacy”.\(^{142}\) In the area of surveillance, organisational profusion at the level of policy-implementation and enforcement has implications for the transparency and accountability of surveillance practices in democratic regimes.

### 2.1.3 Surveillance policy: data retention

We now move from the general to the particular in focusing on a specific recent example of policy-making content and process: data-retention policy in the EU.

#### 2.1.3.1 Data retention as a form of surveillance

Deliverable 1.1 outlined several types of surveillance and the technologies they involve; these types include watching, listening, locating, detecting, and personal data monitoring (“dataveillance”). It was pointed out that some types are targeted on particular individuals, groups, or social categories of persons, while others operate generically. There is, however, a further practice that is defined in terms of time rather than in terms of a particular technology, a direction of attention, or a specific purpose, and that involves practices further downstream from the collection of data by whatever means. This practice – data retention – involves the storage of information, whether personally identifiable or not, for specified or unspecified periods of time.

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Data retention is part of a specific form of surveillance even if it does not come to mind immediately as a surveillance method. The reason that data retention is not closely associated with surveillance in the public mind might be the fact that data retention is a non-visual, non-real time, empirically unnoticeable form of observation of citizens that people normally may “face” only in statutory provisions or media narratives. Yet data retention is intrinsically involved with surveillance, more precisely to dataveillance, since it enables states to collect data related to their citizens’ activities and to use these data to understand and control or assist the subjects of monitoring.\textsuperscript{143}\ The retention of traffic and location data perfectly meets the definition of surveillance as presented by David Lyon: “a focused, systematic, and routine attention to personal details in the end to individuals for the purposes of influencing and protecting those whose data have been garnered”.\textsuperscript{144}

Owing to its \textit{quantitative} and \textit{qualitative} characteristics, data retention facilitates \textit{mass} and \textit{pervasive} surveillance. As social interactions are conducted today mostly via electronic communication networks, a huge amount of information that is inevitably produced in citizens’ everyday lives is subject to data retention. In particular, the observation of Internet activities represents a uniquely powerful form of surveillance, since the web provides multiple spaces for individuals to be engaged in personal activities: contacting each other, sharing personal ideas, engaging in business transactions, shopping, etc.\textsuperscript{145}\ European data retention law does not allow the retention of the content of communications,\textsuperscript{146}\ and “only” location records and traffic data are to be stored;\textsuperscript{147}\ these can be used for creating clear tracking profiles of targeted persons.\textsuperscript{148}\ It is widely held that these “footprints” may give a very rich, comprehensive picture of individuals' personal habits, preferences, interactions, associations, etc.\textsuperscript{149}\ Findings of a study from the Massachusetts Institute for

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146 However, one can reasonably assume that the increasing storage and computing capacity and its decreasing costs will lead to demands for retaining the content of the communication as well.

147 For detailed discussion of these categories of data, see Rauhofer, Judith, “Just because you’re paranoid, doesn’t mean they’re not after you: legislative developments in relation to the mandatory retention of communications data in the European Union” \textit{SCRIPT-ed}, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2006, pp. 323-324.

148 To see the extent to which telecommunications data enable individuals to be followed, see the website of the German daily \textit{Die Zeit} (http://www.zeit.de/datenschutz/malte-spitz-vorratsdaten). An interactive map shows the information that the combination of geographical location and Internet traffic data tracked within a six-month period provides for the surveillors. The infograph was prepared from personal data related to the German Green politician, Malte Spitz, who went to court to obtain six-months’ worth of data from his Internet and mobile phone service provider, Deutsche Telekom. By pushing the play button, viewers can begin a detailed journey through six months of his life.

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Technology showed that traffic data allow the revelation of a user’s circle of colleagues, friends, and acquaintances with 90 per cent accuracy. They also allow a prediction whether one will meet a person in the next 12 hours also in 90% of cases. Moreover, traffic and location data only of the previous month allows a prediction of one’s location in the next 12 hours in 95% of cases, and they also tell one’s general activities in the next 12 hours with 80% accuracy.\textsuperscript{150}

The pervasiveness of data retention is associated not only with the range of the data being kept but also with the involvement of private sector entities in law enforcement. Drawing upon communication service providers’ (CSPs’) knowledge, expertise, human resources, and technical support for law enforcement purposes greatly expands the state’s surveillance capacities, and in sense shifts the police presence beyond the state into the private sphere.\textsuperscript{151} The obligation of CSPs to assist law enforcement agencies in gathering and analysing data on individuals does not only result in a massive growth of the role of the state in social control but also blurs the boundaries of responsibility for posing dangers to privacy between the government and private actors.

2.1.3.2 \textit{The emergence of data retention on the EU policy agenda}

Among the relatively wide scale of dataveillance tools existing today in the EU surveillance regime, the Data Retention Directive of 2006\textsuperscript{152} has given rise to the most intense controversy. Until 2004 the issue of a common approach for countering organised crime and terrorism did not gain prominence on the EU policy agenda.\textsuperscript{153} This is not surprising when considering that the inherent and primary aim of the establishment of the EU was the economic and monetary integration of Member States. Attempts to counter global security threats fall far beyond the scope of this aspiration. True enough, political deliberations on data retention had already taken place in Europe in the early 2000s, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attack of 2001 in New York, when President George W. Bush asked the EU to assist the US in its international effort against terrorism. The long list of proposed actions for EU-US counter-terrorism co-operation included the implementation of data retention, but in a restricted form that would have pertained only to certain critical information requested for law enforcement authorities (data preservation).\textsuperscript{154} Although a number of Member States had already adopted data retention statutes at that time, the EU was reluctant to harmonise the diverging data retention regimes until 2004 despite external pressure. The radical change was triggered by the terrorist bombing attacks in Madrid and London that directed lawmakers’ attention to EU mechanisms for the

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{154} See the letter of Mr James J. Foster, Deputy Chief of the United States Mission to the former President of the European Commission, Mr Romano Prodi: http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/nov/06Ausalet.htm.
\end{thebibliography}
intensification of the collection, storage and exchange of personal data. Adopting the Directive in 2006 was a direct legal manifestation of this attempt. The main point of its adoption was the standardisation of national regulations of the way in which traffic data are stored by CSPs. By choosing the form of a Directive from the range of possible legally binding instruments, lawmakers provided considerable leeway for Member States in implementing the mandatory data retention requirements. The Directive obliges telephony suppliers and internet service providers (ISPs) to retain, for up to 2 years, communication traffic and location data, and information about subscribers, for the purposes of investigating, detecting and prosecuting serious crime.

2.1.3.3 Criticisms of data retention: output and outcome

Data retention policy in general, and in EU’s Data Retention Directive in particular, have been facing heavy criticism from many societal and policy actors, and from many perspectives. No one questions, however, the legitimacy of purpose, i.e., that a democratic regime must be engaged in fighting crime. However, a wide range of regulatory or non-regulatory instruments are available, according to surveys among victims and criminals, official pronouncements, media narratives, and academic articles. Among these, only one possible response is the storage of all individuals’ communications data. Therefore, the main criticisms focus on the rationality, efficiency, necessity and proportionality of data retention surveillance in the light of both the output of data retention (i.e., the extent to which the goal of combating crime has been achieved) and the outcome of storing telecommunications data (i.e., the overall social, economic, political, legal and other costs), with special emphasis on the encroachment upon the right to privacy of individuals. Evaluations of these illustrative aspects of policy content are important parts of the process of policy-making.

2.1.3.3.1 The output of data retention policy: effectiveness

As explained above, the output of data retention policy raises the questions of the rationality and effectiveness of data retention, i.e., the question concerning the extent to which the goal of combating crime and terrorism can be achieved with the mandatory storage of communications data.

In theory, traffic and location records might be quite important in law enforcement procedures by providing key information both for detecting organised crime activities and for granting evidences of guilt (or even innocence) before the courts. Indeed, it is without doubt that these records might play an especially important role in identifying criminals, especially those who use screen names or pseudonyms on the Internet. Nevertheless, serious doubts have been raised about the reliability of the retained data. As Caspar Bowden, the former Director of the Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR) argues, “traffic data cannot prove the identity of the author of an e-mail or the person who actually made a particular call. … No amount of traffic

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data by itself can prove an alibi, because while it may be persuasive circumstantially, it does not eliminate the possibility that a bogus trail has been carefully laid by an accomplice. A study prepared by the US Center for Democracy and Technology also argues that, as a result of the same trend in address allocation, IP address data may no longer reliably identify individual end-user devices, thus reducing the effectiveness of data retention mandates.

In addition to these points, the available quantitative and qualitative information based upon the practical experiences of the implementation of the Directive failed to prove that data retention is a necessary instrument to fight serious crime. Here it should be noted that Member States have scarcely fulfilled their legal obligation to provide statistics on the use of data retained under the Directive, thus limiting the ability to assess precisely the usefulness of data retention requirements. Although Member States have generally reported data retention valuable and in some cases indispensable, as revealed in the evaluation report of the European Commission on the Directive, the available statistical information is unable to provide relevant evidence for its effectiveness. No Member State has provided evidence that could establish that data retention is useful for fighting crimes. Therefore, Member States’ general evaluations can be deemed political, rather than evidence-based statements.

Indeed, the existing statistics that can be relied on even underpin the opposite: that indiscriminate and blanket telecommunications data retention has had no statistically significant effect on crime or crime-solving trends. For instance, according to the official German policy crime statistics of 2011, with the Data Retention Directive in force, more serious criminal acts were registered than before (1,359,102 in 2007, and 1,422,968 in 2009) and a smaller proportion, even, were cleared up (77.6% in 2007, and 76.3% in 2009). Several other studies conducted by independent organisations demonstrate that blanket data retention has proven to be superfluous.

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158 This study accurately explains that many IP addresses no longer uniquely identify users and end-user devices. “Data Retention Mandates: Changes in Internet Addressing Technology Affect Cost, Effectiveness, and Proportionality”, Center for Democracy & Technology, Sept. 2011, www.cdt.org%2Ffiles%2FCDT_Data_Retention-NAT_Paper.doc&ei=jO56UNyjHI7KtAbhH3IH4Ag&usg=AFQjCNGGc1adj9md4LOchqzrOYzAeUZ9 3g>

159 Article 10 of the Data Retention Directive stipulates that Member States shall ensure that the Commission is provided on a yearly basis with statistics on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or a public communications network.

160 According to the Evaluation Report from the European Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the Data Retention Directive, the Czech Republic considered data retention “completely indispensable in a large number of cases”; Hungary said it was “indispensable in [law enforcement agencies] regular activities”; Slovenia stated that the absence of retained data would “paralyze the law enforcement agencies’ operation”; a United Kingdom police agency described the availability of traffic data as “absolutely crucial (…) to investigating the threat of terrorism and serious crime”. See COM(2011)225, 18.4.2011 <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52011DC0225:EN:HTML>, p. 23.


since the large number of requests for retained data had virtually no effect on the
detection of crimes. This picture is confirmed by the findings of the Max Planck
Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law, which concluded that blanket
data retention in Germany might only bring a difference to 0.002% of criminal
investigations at most.\footnote{Forschungsbericht des Max-Planck-Instituts für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/084/1608434.pdf>. For an interpretative summary of the findings see the EDRI’s Shadow report on the Data Retention Directive, ibid, p. 14.} Research conducted at Erasmus University Rotterdam, studying 65 criminal cases in terms of the usefulness of data retention for law
enforcement purposes, found that that requests for traffic data could “nearly always”

\subsection*{2.1.3.3.2 The outcome of data retention policy: overall costs}

The outcome of the introduction of data retention rules in terms of their intended and
unintended costs has led to widespread European criticism from many different
groups and for many different reasons. Central to these criticisms lie the questions
of necessity and proportionality of the mandatory storage of all traffic and location data
relating to all EU individuals in the European Union especially for such a long time
that is prescribed by the Directive (6-24 months).

Under the flag of the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, political actors,
worldwide co-ordinated public protests, as well as academics have repeatedly argued
that data retention undermines democratic practises and free society by undermining
the right to privacy, the right to remain anonymous, the presumption of innocence,
and social confidence. Several surveys conducted by independent organisations
suggest that the pervasive surveillance performed by data retention changes
individuals’ social behaviour, jeopardises their autonomous decision-making,
discourages their participating in public debate, and chills their personal activities.
Data retention may result in all the potential harms that are associated with privacy
implementation of the Directive led even the European Data Protection Supervisor
itself to conclude that the Directive is “the most privacy invasive instrument ever

As for the social effects, a poll of 1002 Germans in 2008 found that indiscriminate
data retention has a strong chilling effect on the use of mobile phones, e-mail and
other Internet activities. The findings show that more than half the respondents (52%)
would refrain from confidential contacts if they needed help: for example, from contacting a marriage counsellor, a psychotherapist, or a drug-misuse counsellor by phone or e-mail. Moreover, 11% of the respondents said that they had already abstained from using a telephone, mobile phone or e-mail on certain occasions, and 6% believe they receive less communication since the beginning of data retention.\footnote{Opinions of citizens on data retention. Forsa Institute, 2 June, 2008., p. 3. Available at http://www.vorratsdatenspeicherung.de/content/view/228/79/.
} However, the poll also revealed that 48% still think that data retention is a necessary step for crime prevention.

Possible negative impacts of data retention on freedoms of expression and the press are also suggested. Traffic data can easily be misused to spy on journalists and to expose their sources and whistleblowers. What makes matters worse from this perspective is the lack of guarantees of high data security in order to guard against misuses. Cases such as the widely known abuse of T-Mobile, whose staff sold millions of records from thousands of customers on the black market,\footnote{BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8364421.stm.} do not enhance trust in CSPs who are responsible for taking adequate safety measures in order to protect personal data.

Acting as guardians of their constitutional system, the highest judicial authorities of several Member States have ruled that the implementation of the Directive in domestic law was unconstitutional.\footnote{For a detailed analyses of judicial challenges, see: Konstandinides, Theodore, “Destroying democracy on the ground of defending it?: The Data Retention Directive, the surveillance state and our constitutional ecosystem”, European Law Review, Vol. 35, No. 5, 2011, pp. 727-733.} So did the Constitutional Court of Romania, Germany, the Czech Republic, as well as the Irish High Court, but a number of cases are pending before other national courts.\footnote{The actions of some Member States’ national courts are described in Task 2.3.} These courts had to act under enormous pressure to uphold constitutional values. In Germany, for instance, due to the tireless campaign of the German Working Group on Data Retention, 34,451 citizens took part as plaintiffs in the constitutional complaint procedure before the Federal Constitutional Court. All these courts concluded that the relevant national laws did not ensure adequate safeguards in order to balance between the serious infringement of the right to privacy and other freedoms affected, on the one hand, and the legitimate purpose of combating crime, on the other.

Apart from the legal and societal risks, underlying cost-benefit analyses have also raised serious concerns. Such existing analyses question whether data retention represents a more efficient allocation of resources (on a cost-benefit basis) than if such resources were put to alternative use. Maria-Helen Maras concludes that the economic advantages of pursuing EU-wide data retention are more than outweighed by its economic disadvantages. She shows that the Directive may negatively impact upon competition and other economic policies in the EU by leading consumers to use international webmail services (that is, non-EU providers), and new (and even existing) market participants to take their businesses elsewhere. In all, she found the Directive a disproportionate measure.\footnote{Maras, Maria-Helen, “The economic costs and consequences of mass communications data retention: is the Data Retention Directive a proportionate measure?” European Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2012, pp. 447-472.}
The case study above has provided a brief description of the policy of data retention as an example of surveillance and a brief analysis of evaluative criticisms. Putting these criticisms together (and not putting them aside, as policy-makers tend to do), they point to the conclusion that data retention has minimal effects within, but significant effects beyond its explicit scope, and that these unintended consequences have been shown to be costly in several dimensions. In Deliverable 2.3, we describe the response that has occurred in several Member States over the constitutionality and legality of the Directive’s implementation and other measures of data retention, in the context of fundamental rights. The recent interest in the “right to be forgotten” as part of the proposed reform of EU data protection law is not unrelated to the question of the retention of data insofar as this right would enable citizens further to realise their existing rights to challenge the collection of personal data and obtain its erasure. It would strengthen the well-established requirement, stated in Article 6(e) of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, that personally identifiable data be held “for no longer than is necessary” unless stored for longer periods for historical, statistical or scientific use. In order to give better effect to this statutory right, writing deletion more strongly into law and possibly designating expiration dates into information systems have been proposed and discussed, although the rhetoric of the proposed new “right” has aroused scepticism. Koops, for example, argues that “there is no consensus what exactly a right to be forgotten means, and its status – as a right, interest, or value; in need of reinforcement or to be created from scratch – is unclear.”

Whether the “right to be forgotten” will remain largely as an inspirational mantra without effective legal embodiment is not certain. Nonetheless, it is a countervailing force against the prevailing trend underlined by the Chairman of Google, Eric Schmidt: “Pretty soon, in a year or two, with the phones many of you have already and the tablets, you will never forget anything. Starting soon it will be possible to remember the hotels you went to, the pictures you took, the friends you met, because computer memories last forever.”

2.1.4 POLICY-MAKING AND SURVEILLANCE: CONCLUSION

The brief discussion of surveillance policy-making has pointed up several salient issues for a political perspective on surveillance. These include not only the way policies are made, implemented and evaluated, but also their impact upon society, the

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political system, rights and freedoms. The accountability and transparency of policy and practice are integral to these considerations, as is the rule of law. The next sections examine these crucial dimensions of the political perspective.

2.2 ACCOUNTABILITY

We continue with a discussion of accountability. As the thrust of our argument in Chapter 2 makes clear, good policy-making requires debate, accountability and an evidence-based link between problems and solutions. In the case of surveillance technologies, security theatre, and the need for fast, visible policy responses to events and fears, public debate and policy deliberation are being short-circuited, raising questions about the democratic accountability of our political systems.

The accountability of rulers to their publics is a central pillar of the modern democratic state, manifested in elections and other forms of relationship through which office-holders justify their claim to continue in office by subjecting their record of performance to the scrutiny and approval of the electorate. Although perhaps less exemplified in practice, the principle of accountability is also prominent in the corporate economy, in which managers and executives periodically put their case for the continued support of shareholders. In the world of surveillance, which involves the performance of those who collect, process, and communicate information relating to persons, the question of accountability is less straightforward and accountability practices are far less developed. Yet there is a growing mood that holds that surveillance users ought to be accountable to those whose information they handle and to others who may be affected by surveillance practices. How this drive for accountability will relate to other forms of surveillance scrutiny and regulation is yet to be determined.

“Accountability”, however, is an elusive concept. It is a familiar term in English, but may lead to misinterpretation because it may differ in other languages and under different legal jurisdictions, as the EU’s Article 29 Working Party, established under the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC, pointed out. They note that other terms could be “reinforced responsibility”, “assurance”, “reliability”, “trustworthiness” and “obligation de rendre des comptes”. Mulgan distinguishes between internal and external aspects of accountability. He argues that in the governmental world, internal accountability or responsibility has to do with the professionalism and personal morality or conscience of public servants and others in the exercise of their functions, and especially of their discretion. But within an organisation, it also involves accountability to hierarchical superiors, and therefore there is, in a sense, an element of externality for the individual official, beyond her own personal morality. On the other hand, external accountability more conventionally involves some agent,

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external to the organisation, in assessing and investigating actions or failures to act, and in imposing sanctions, but these processes will also touch on professional and personal factors that explain the action. The internal and external aspects are therefore connected in complex ways, but the conceptual distinction between having and not having to account to someone else for one’s actions remains. In any case, the crucial question identified by Bennett is “[a]ccountability for what and to whom?”\(^\text{178}\) It is especially the external form of accountability that appears relevant in the case of privacy protection, because it corresponds more closely to the relationship of data controllers to data subjects, as well as to regulators and the general public. On the other hand, there is an important current trend to develop internal accountability within data-controlling organisations, including codified elements of ethical conduct for individuals to practice within a regime of information governance, as will be explained below.

The 14\(^{th}\) Guideline – the “Accountability Principle” – of the prominent 1981 OECD data protection Guidelines says that data controllers should be accountable for measures that give effect to data protection principles. The 62\(^{nd}\) explanatory paragraph of the Guidelines says that ‘accountability’ refers to legal sanctions as well as the requirements set out in codes of conduct.\(^\text{179}\) Most of the existing strategies of surveillance regulation, including instruments for data protection, have emphasised legal and technical arrangements for limiting surveillance and for sanctioning excesses in the activities that comprise surveillance. Laws and mechanisms to enforce legal compliance, self-regulatory instruments including codes of practice, and technological tools and design have attracted the most attention from policy-makers and commentators;\(^\text{180}\) this repertory is discussed in further detail later on, where we focus upon the governance of surveillance. But as will be discussed, some recent developments in this field are concerned more directly with foregrounding accountability requirements themselves.

If they are crafted properly and accompanied by sufficient oversight and enforcement powers, the existing array of types of regulatory measure can exert a powerful influence to limit surveillance in the interests of liberty and democracy. For laws and self-regulation to have this effect, they should be couched in organisational environments and cultures in which information governance is taken seriously. The definition of “information governance” espoused by Gartner, the IT research and advisory group, is “the specification of decision rights and an accountability framework to encourage desirable behaviour in the valuation, creation, storage, use, archival and deletion of information”.\(^\text{181}\) In this context, the organisational practices, including processes of accountability in which those who gather and control personal data engage, have received increasing attention in more recent years. A further element is the need for organisations to take seriously the requirement imposed upon


data controllers by the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC\textsuperscript{182} in terms of the security of data processing, which involves not only technical measures such as encryption, passwords, and other tools, but also “appropriate … organizational measures to protect personal data against accidental or unlawful destruction or accidental loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure or access, … and against all other unlawful forms of processing”.

Increasing attention can also be attributed in part to the proliferation of data breaches in many countries in the 2000s, violating laws and principles of data protection and reducing the trust in which the public holds private and public sector users of surveillance. The spotlight has turned to the scrutiny of organisational procedures that arbitrate the extent to which data controllers and other surveillance operators are equipped to apply the criteria of privacy protection and the safeguarding of other human values to their information practices when they are the custodians of individuals’ personal information. The promotion of better processes of data handling has been one important result. In the UK, for example, following a host of central-government breaches, the Cabinet Office Data Handling Report laid down many mandatory requirements aimed to strengthen accountability, particularly at senior organisational levels in government departments. It did this by establishing new roles, by ensuring that information risks are considered early on, and by seeking to “foster a culture of individual accountability throughout the organisation, with targeted, relevant, role-based training to ensure that employees have a clear understanding of how to use and share information securely”.\textsuperscript{183} A further report charted progress in implementing these measures in the context of managing information risk, and renewed the emphasis on accountability and clarifying lines of responsibility.\textsuperscript{184} A major review on data sharing in government also subscribed to the view of accountability, as well as transparency and responsibility, as being a prime requirement in information governance.\textsuperscript{185}

All these developments beneficially promote accountability, but they appear to reproduce a common and misleading understanding of accountability by eliding this concept with ‘responsibility’ for undertaking certain actions, for example, in regard to surveillance or data processing. Thus a 2002 Canadian Treasury Board document on privacy impact assessment (PIA) includes a section on “Accountability” in which it states that that senior officials in public organisations and others are ‘responsible for’ carrying out and ensuring the implementation of the PIA policy through the performance of specific activities: in other words, what they must do.\textsuperscript{186} We can thereby only understand who is supposed to do what – a form of role description that may be useful in bringing sanctions or rewards to bear, depending on the quality of the performance, but that goes no further in describing any process of accountability for this performance.

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\textsuperscript{182} European Parliament and the Council, Directive 95/46/EC of 24.10.1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, Article 17(1).
\end{flushleft}
But accountability is not easily achieved because, as a UK Parliamentary report observed, the trend towards data sharing in the public sector has shown the difficulty of tracing the flow of personal data and of maintaining clarity about who is responsible for it and how they can be held accountable.\footnote{House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, \textit{Surveillance: Citizens and the State, Volume I: Report}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Report of Session 2008-09, HL Paper 18-I, The Stationery Office Limited, London, 2009, p. 19.} A leading UK legal expert has argued that the constitutional convention that government ministers are accountable to Parliament could mean that surveillance activities undertaken under ministerial authorisation should be subjected to parliamentary scrutiny.\footnote{House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, \textit{Surveillance: Citizens and the State, Volume II: Evidence}, 2\textsuperscript{nd} Report of Session 2008-09, HL Paper 18-II, The Stationery Office Limited, London, 2009, Oral evidence of Professor David Feldman, Q 518.} This indicates that the question of who should be held accountable can be asked at all levels of surveillance systems, and does not only pertain to back-room or street-level operatives, or to systems managers and controllers at higher levels or organisational hierarchies. Parliamentary or other forms of external scrutiny help to cast light on practices and to increase the amount of public information about surveillance that is available in a democracy. Thus the principle of accountability is interdependent with the principle of transparency in the effort to retain public confidence, as the UK Information Commissioner implied in insisting that “public authorities must remain transparent and accountable if they are to retain the trust of the public they serve”.\footnote{UK Information Commissioner’s Office, News Release 5 July 2012, ‘ICO shows its teeth, as the public’s concern with illegal marketing calls grows’, http://www.ico.gov.uk/news/latest_news/2012/ico-shows-its-teeth-as-the-public-concern-over-illegal-marketing-calls-grows-05072012.aspx, accessed 5 July 2012.} Transparency is discussed later, but its relationship to accountability needs to be articulated more precisely, in terms of a better understanding of the meaning of accountability, which is explored shortly.

Accountability moved centre-stage in 2012 in the current phase that is expected to lead to the adoption of a new EU Regulation to replace Directive 95/46/EC. New ways of ensuring accountability have attracted the attention of those drafting the new Regulation as well as of influential official commentators on this legislative change. Yet there is some lack of clarity: the proposed Regulation explains that “Article 22 takes account of the debate on a ‘principle of accountability’ and describes in detail the obligation of responsibility of the controller to comply with this Regulation and to demonstrate this compliance, including by way of adoption of internal policies and mechanisms for ensuring such compliance”.\footnote{European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, Brussels, 25.1.2012, p.10 (3.4.4.1).} But Article 22 itself nowhere mentions accountability, although it does specify that the data controller must “ensure and be able to demonstrate that the processing of personal data is performed in compliance with this Regulation”, and “ensure the verification of the effectiveness of the [compliance] measures”. A form of external or internal accountability is provided for “[i]f proportionate”, whereupon “this verification shall be carried out by independent internal or external auditors”.

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\item European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final, Brussels, 25.1.2012, p.10 (3.4.4.1).
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These provisions follow closely the proposal for a general accountability principle put forward by the 2010 Opinion of the Article 29 Working Party.\textsuperscript{191} This proposal mainly describes the actions that data controllers must undertake in order to comply with the law and the principles of data protection, and requires them to “demonstrate on request” to regulatory authorities the compliance measures they have taken and their effectiveness.\textsuperscript{192} It is very short on what this “demonstration” should consist of, in terms of the information conveyed externally, but the European Data Protection Supervisor’s welcoming comment on the draft Regulation inches closer to this accountability requirement by suggesting that the data controller produce, whether voluntarily or under a legal obligation, a regular report on its activities that would include the measures taken and their effectiveness.\textsuperscript{193}

This discourse around the proposed Regulation shows considerable affinity with an industry-led development project aimed at inserting accountability at the centre of self-regulation. The “Accountability Project” has apparently been influential over the thinking and drafting of the Regulation, although it too is particularly weak on the concept of accountability itself as something distinguishable from responsibility and as something that could require more than a requested demonstration of compliance and effectiveness. Much the same can be said for the accountability principle incorporated into the 2009 Madrid Resolution, adopted by the international conference of data protection and privacy commissioners.\textsuperscript{194} As with all the documents mentioned here, the language of “demonstration” of accountability is prolifically used, especially in the Accountability Project.\textsuperscript{195} There is no explanation of what a demonstration would entail apart from the actions or phenomena to which the demonstration is supposed to testify: the organisation’s capacity and willingness to be accountable and to achieve privacy objectives; its possession of an infrastructure for responsibility; its commitment; its adoption of responsible policies; and the like. The demonstration will involve external, independent third parties and regulators, and internal monitoring.

Indeed, as Raab argues,\textsuperscript{196} it is the communicative dimension of accountability, related to transparency, that needs to be developed if accountability is to be a more robust requirement in the environment of surveillance and data protection. This requires an understanding of accountability as involving the giving, receiving, and


\textsuperscript{193} European Data Protection Supervisor, \textit{Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the data protection reform package}, 7 March 2012, para. 176.


scrutiny of an “account” as a narrative about the surveillance, about the compliance or other measures taken to safeguard privacy, and about their effectiveness. Merely to require a user of surveillance to demonstrate, or to be prepared to demonstrate on request, how responsibly they are behaving, says nothing about what that demonstration must consist of, how it is to be communicated, and what its dialogic afterlife might be in any forensic forum through which it could be debated. More work needs to be done to develop the accountability codes and frames within which a company reports its activities, specifying the kinds of information needed by the external reviewers of these accounts.

If an account is a story, what it looks like is critically important, but so too is the way in which it is questioned, challenged, verified or denied by the receiver of the account. To “give an account” – rendre des comptes – is to tell a story, and three levels can be distinguished. First, on a weak definition, it means the obligation of an organisation to report back, to “give an account of its actions”. Second, on a stronger definition, it means that, plus the implication that the audience can interrogate the account and produce other accounts “on their own account”. Third, on the strongest definition, it means the previous two, plus the implication that sanctions can be brought to bear where there is a general agreement that the organisation has “given a bad account of itself”, either (a) through its inactions, or (b) through its own unsatisfactory production of an account. The audience, which may be the public, can thus “hold the organisation to account”, and that might have real consequences.

Current discourse and practical development of accountability in surveillance limitation and data protection do not explore these avenues, and remain mainly at the first level indicated above. It is hard to identify in current developments the material or conceptual culture of accountability demonstrations, apart from the very worthy materials and concepts regarding the organisation’s information-governance action that the demonstration might re-present, or any clear indication that these elements of the communication and dialogue of accountability would need to be developed in successive iterations of the Accountability Project, or in the implementation of the new EU Regulation.

### 2.3 TRANSPARENCY

#### 2.3.1 Introduction

Among the wide range of democratic values, transparency is not one that is closely associated with surveillance in the public mind. In public policy discourse,

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198 For terminological clarity, it is noted that there is a parallel and divergent development in the meaning of the word ‘transparency’ in recent years: in contemporary literature on political philosophy and constitutional matters, ‘transparency’ generally designates the democratic value of open government and the free flow of the information related to the public sphere. On the other hand, in the surveillance context ‘transparency’ is increasingly used in terms of the visibility of the citizen. In this connotation, transparency is basically considered as a harmful phenomenon to be avoided and feared, but it is not without precedent in the literature that citizens’ transparency is deemed a good scenario to
transparency is mainly discussed in terms of a key factor in ensuring governmental accountability – discussed earlier – and fighting corruption. Perhaps less frequently emphasised, a commonly agreed approach to transparency is also the description of this value as a necessary vehicle for participation in public debates through exercising certain political fundamental rights such as the ones reflected in the freedoms of expression and the press. However, as a core attribute of democracy, transparency has a much deeper and more comprehensive meaning than these traditional contexts obviously assign to it. Focusing on the essential function that transparency is supposed to fulfil in a liberal democracy allows us to contemplate and explore what implications the commitment to this value might, and even should, have specifically for surveillance societies. This functional approach helps us not only to establish the relevance of transparency to surveillance, but also to get closer to answering the question of who should be transparent, why, and with what costs, in a democratic society that features more and more pervasive surveillance.

2.3.2 The intrinsic function of transparency: scrutinising power

Liberal democracies rest on the principles that individuals are equally free, and that, in the interest of this liberty, the power of the state is strictly limited. Transparency is an indispensable condition for the realisation of these fundamental principles. To stand any realistic chance to make knowledgeable individual choices, and to hold institutional power in check, citizens, as autonomous beings, must be able to possess adequate, accurate, and detailed information about the political, economic, and social forces exerting influence on their fundamental rights. In short, transparency is a guarantee of greater legitimacy of the exercise of power affecting people’s autonomy and freedoms. It is a vital tool for counterbalancing the strength of powerful actors by ensuring that power is wielded in a responsible and accountable manner. Departing from the axiom that surveillance produces knowledge, and knowledge produces power – which needs to be plausibly justified and put under public scrutiny – it may be simply stated that where surveillance is performed, there must be some degree of transparency.

2.3.3 The mutual dependence of privacy and transparency

Ever since surveillance issues entered policy and academic discourse, privacy has always been in the focus of attention. The same cannot be said for transparency.
Nevertheless, thinking about transparency from a functional angle encourages us to recognise that the protection of personal liberty depends not only on how people can control access to their personal information, but also how citizens’ access to the information on the operation of power can be promoted. The relationship between these two basic components of so-called “informational autonomy”, namely between the values of privacy and transparency, is not only complementary but also interdependent. The meaning and the meaningfulness of this mutual dependence are, however, not revealed in the conventional competitive concept of these values, according to which privacy and transparency conflict and cancel each other out. On the contrary, in what follows, it will be argued, although unusually, that privacy and transparency mutually presuppose each other’s realisation. Theorising this interdependence might suggest to policy framers and lawmakers that, for the sake of good government protecting autonomy and freedoms, both values must be assured at a high level.

2.3.3.1 Privacy with and without transparency

Historical totalitarian regimes that sought to design a totalised form of surveillance clearly illustrate the mutually shaping relationship between privacy and transparency. It was not by accident that totalitarian regimes put serious effort into the systematic suppression of people’s authentic knowledge, and carried out surveillance secretly. As Maria Los says in her analysis of the totalitarian potential, “[t]he masses need to acquire a Kafkaesque sense that the true power structure does not lie in the visible maze of offices, but is deeply hidden and profoundly secret.” Negating transparency by depriving individuals of information about when, by whom, for what purpose, etc. their behaviour can be surveilled was a perfectly satisfactory means of taking away individual privacy, and with it, liberty. The totalitarian arrangement of surveillance taught us that the extent of the invasion of privacy depends strongly on the extent of the confidence of being and acting one’s self, discussing matters in private, etc. This connection was drawn in Lawrence Lessig’s criticism of the perfection of the totalitarianism of Oceania in Orwell’s impressive novel. Lessig argues that the telescreen, the central device for surveillance in Oceania, was inefficient to build perfect totalitarianism because the location and the perspective of the telescreen were transparent, and thus Winston knew where to do things he did not want Big Brother to see. Bentham’s Panopticon was also based on the assumption that human autonomy and further aspects of identity are much more vulnerable to surveillance practices being performed in a non-transparent way. The great strength of the arrangement of the Panopticon lies not only in its maximising the visibility of inmates by allowing them no place to hide from the watchers but also, more seriously,
in the structure which let the guards observe inmates while remaining unseen. As Bentham explains, “[t]he essence of it consists … in the centrality of the Inspector’s situation, combined with the well-known and most effective contrivances for seeing without being seen.”

The interwoven relationship of privacy and transparency equally applies to rule-of-law regimes, even though undoubtedly under different conditions. It can be maintained that the subjective right to informational self-determination – the very core of the modern concept of informational privacy, as mentioned in Task 1.5 – remains only an illusion without the disclosure of reliable information on the interference of individuals’ privacy rights. To have a feasible opportunity to give informed consent to the collection and use of one’s personal information, as well as to possess the ability to follow the fate of one’s own data, an awareness and understanding of the policies and detailed parameters of the particular data management – including both the beneficial and jeopardising consequences of consent – are of an importance which can hardly be exaggerated. In addition, transparency plays a pivotal role in the enforcement of the legal requirements imposed on data processors. Any normative standard regarding privacy rights – such as the need for an underlying legal basis, necessity, and proportionality – only makes sense if one can recognise and adequately determine when and how his or her right is supposed to have been infringed, and if competent authorities are also capable of following the implementation of norms. The importance of the role of transparency in legal privacy matters is also reflected in the case law developed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on state surveillance, which is basically centred upon the requirements of creating transparent frameworks for, and providing public scrutiny of, surveillance practices.

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205 Emphasis in original. It is also important to emphasise a more complicated (path-dependent) interplay between surveillance and transparency in former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In its most powerful manifestation, this interplay served as a basis for the political legitimacy of a reunified Germany after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. “Germany’s new-found moral legitimacy came to rest on portraying East Germany as an immoral state; the former socialist state became an object that needed to be made fully transparent. The East German secret police (Stasi) and its vast surveillance apparatus became a natural target of transparency, as it inverted the logic of transparency by which the West German state claimed to function. As one form of transparency became key to legitimacy in Germany, its inversion – surveillance – became a marker of illegitimacy.” See Sperling, Stefan: “The Politics of Transparency and Surveillance in Post-Reunification Germany”, Surveillance & Society Vol. 8, No. 4, 2011, pp. 396-412.

206 This discussion is even more complex in postcommunist societies that simultaneously built rule-of-law regimes and had to come to terms with their own communist past. As a significant part of transitional justice, many CEE countries established ‘memory institutes’ (ÚPN in Slovakia, IPN in Poland, ABTL in Hungary, and ÚSTR in Czech Republic, all established after 2000). Their role was to serve as a means to redress legacies of the former regimes’ abuses by allowing individuals access to information that ŠTB, SB or AVO compiled on them and by making files publicly available. At the same time, these countries faced dilemmas of how to satisfy the need for justice, i.e., transparency about the past, and demands by recently introduced data protection laws.

2.3.3.2 Transparency with and without privacy

Recognising the interdependence of privacy and transparency suggests that the enforcement of transparency also calls for the implementation of privacy, and not only is the opposite true. The argument for this direction of interdependence rests upon two premises. The first is that transparency does not become a reality, at least in moral sense, by merely enabling free access to an amount of public information. The core value of a transparent society is manifested not in the revealed information itself but in the knowledge and in the certain behavioural liberties that public data put into citizens’ hands. The second premise is that mere access to public information does not mechanistically produce the knowledge and certain actions that transparency is supposed to promote. The success of transparency mechanisms equally depends upon the cognitive, social, and legal status of the recipient “audience” for the available information. Hence the question is: Can members of the political community be expected to exploit the multiple benefits of free access to public data while being under constant, overt surveillance?

As explored above, the free flow of public information allows people to participate knowledgeably in democratic deliberation and control, to learn from and disseminate of public information, to express their views on, and to make individual choices with regard to what the government and other stakeholders are doing. Transparency, as a bridge between the public and the private, the powerful and the powerless, enables also the sharing of inputs and feedbacks (ideas, concerns, criticisms) among these actors, and thereby can further increase the legitimacy and quality of authorities’ actions. As can be seen, the realisation of transparency, if it qualifies as a substantial value, is based upon citizens’ ability to deliberate autonomously and upon their capacity and willingness for sovereign action. Privacy, as several advocates maintain – especially those who examine privacy’s functions in socio-political and psychological dimensions – is at the core of this capacity, as was seen in Deliverable 1.1. At the socio-political level, the loss of privacy deprives persons of the chance of discussing public matters privately, remaining incognito when expressing their opinions, reviewing and criticising the powers opaquely, etc. Even if such a person willingly appeared to participate in public life under such circumstances, his acting would not be an independent voice; he would censor himself. As Edward Bloustein declared, “[s]uch an individual would merge with the mass. His opinions, being public, tend never to be different; his aspirations, being known, tend always to be conventionally accepted ones; his feelings, being openly exhibited, tend to lose their quality of unique personal warmth and to become the feelings of every man.”

When such conditions apply, the great political, social, and individual potential lying in public information vanishes, and transparency simultaneously becomes functionally “dead”.

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2.4 THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY IN TODAY’S SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY

Considering transparency’s function and its interlocked relationship with privacy leads to the conclusion that transparency should be seen in the centre when seeking mechanisms to address privacy and other particular concerns imposed by contemporary surveillance practices. Transparency can, to a certain extent, counterbalance the power of stakeholders obtained through surveillance by mitigating the informational asymmetry between the surveiller and the surveilled. By enhancing the ability of people to review and understand the operation of the surveillance systems surrounding them, transparency, from functional perspective, virtually works in the same way as surveillance does, but the other way around: as surveillance provides a method of control over citizens for surveillers, so does transparency for citizens over their surveillers.

2.4.1 Transparency-decreasing factors

A key attribute of contemporary surveillance is that it is everywhere, but is hardly observable. There are at least two factors that profoundly inhibit the realisation of transparency in today’s surveillance societies. First, recent technological developments, most notably in the field of ICT, tend to remove surveillance from the face-to-face to the background.\textsuperscript{211} Surveillance methods running at a distance may easily sneak into the private sphere in an unobtrusive or even undetected way. In addition, increasingly sophisticated technological solutions enable more and more complex and extensive surveillance, while the processes of data handling are becoming less and less obvious and transparent.\textsuperscript{212} Consider the devices and applications of ubiquitous computing, for example: the rapid spread of popularity of well-designed smart phones, PDAs, GPS, etc. has been remarkable, but only a few who use such devices are likely to be aware of their surveillance capacities. The fact is that those who do not put serious effort into acquiring knowledge about the operation and impacts of today’s, as well as the emerging, surveillance technologies, but are subject to them, may lose control over the roles they are playing in various contexts based on classification, stereotyping, mistaken identity, etc. Nevertheless, one should not forget that technology can also facilitate transparency when private actors exploit their information advantage over surveillers.

Besides the technological shift, the ability of citizens to oversee surveillance practices is also hindered by the recent shift in power relations.\textsuperscript{213} With, and largely due to, the development of new technologies that have fragmented the informational power inherently possessed by the government, the bipolar structure of power has been replaced by a multipolar one. The government is no longer a single actor in control of

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\textsuperscript{212} Székely, Iván, Máté Dániel Szabó and Beatrix Vissy, “Regulating the future? Law, ethics, and emerging technologies” \textit{Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society}, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2011, p. 188.
\end{footnotesize}
surveillance systems: a wide range of private actors is also involved. In order to maintain democratic control over power, constitutional states must look beyond the governmental-related concept of transparency, and adjust transparency requirements to these new conditions. This is all the more so because transparency is not promoted by the fact that surveillance practices do not exclusively belong to one actor: in other words, because of the practice of “surveillant assemblage”. Since these disparate but closely integrated entities using and sharing personal data have created, as Lyon notes, “a complex matrix of power”, it has become less possible for citizens to know who is in a position that should be feared. Moreover, from the perspectives of democratic control and accountability, it is also of importance that the decentralisation of the informational power on the stronger side – the state and other stakeholders – has necessarily led to the fragmentation of attentions on the weaker side – citizens – both at the individual and the social level.

The significance of this consideration is to point up that the implementation of transparency is prevented in different ways. The conclusion that can be drawn by policy framers is that as much as the guaranteeing of transparency is hampered by technology and surveillant assemblage (or other factors), so much the more is it necessary to be protected and promoted.

2.4.2 A new voice for enhancing transparency

The meagre but growing literature on the role of transparency vis-à-vis surveillance suggests that the current social reality of surveillance has prompted a new voice calling for transparency in the area of privacy policy. An increasing number of privacy advocates tend to support the view that the dominant privacy paradigm, which focuses predominantly on the limitation of the flow of personal data, cannot be maintained. They argue that the existing data protection frameworks aimed at limiting data processing are not very effective, since the extensive manifestation of today’s constant and pervasive surveillance, pushed by technological and social developments in a process of mutual shaping, does not allow citizens to hide from the gaze. Hence, when data mining is inevitable, privacy policy should look for plausible solutions to privacy concerns “outside the data flow box”. The majority of those few who have been deliberating on mechanisms for resistance outside this box suppose that certain forms of transparency hold the key to minimising the risk of data mining.

2.4.3 Transparency-based privacy solutions – with question-marks

Transparency-based privacy solutions offered in the literature rest on the notions of “synoptic surveillance”, “sousveillance”, “countersurveillance”, “watching the watchers”. The common feature of these solutions is the attempt to enhance the ability of people to collect data about the operation of their surveillance, and thus mitigate the inequality between the surveiller and the weaker actors. Apart from this, however, these mechanisms differ considerably from each other in character.

The most radical form of this type of surveillance (if it can be regarded as such) is presented by David Brin, who envisions a completely “transparent society” that is based not on hiding personal information but on the concept that anyone can be surveilled by anyone at any time. According to Brin, “reciprocal transparency”, as he calls it, is “the best hope to preserve a little privacy in the next century”, since it is able to create a proper system of checks and balances for surveillance powers within the whole society. What Brin actually proposes is to stipulate the equality of surveillance powers by letting them “fight” each other through totalising transparency (visibility). The aim of reciprocal transparency, namely to equalise and to hold to account informational power, is highly desirable but not as an ultimate goal that might be achieved at the cost of the complete destruction of individual privacy. However, entitling anybody, indeed everybody, to penetrate one’s most intrinsic private sphere, is not to preserve privacy but completely to give it up by legitimising otherwise morally questionable surveillance practices. Consequently and paradoxically, what Brin suggests is destroying privacy for the sake of protecting it, which seems to be confusing and, not least, frightening. In addition, as William Schermer notes, when envisaging the equal distribution of power, Brin seems to take into account neither pre-existing social inequalities (i.e., money, knowledge, etc.) that might profoundly distort relations, nor the fact that totalising surveillance might easily turn into a tyranny of the majority over the few. All in all, Brin’s extreme scenario can hardly be an output of democratic deliberations on feasible solutions to privacy concerns, but it has provoked fruitful debates over countersurveillance strategies and their constitutional boundaries.

Less drastic but also contradictory forms of synoptic surveillance are the various forms of *sousveillance* (“watching from below”) developed by Steve Mann.²²⁶ Sousveillance relies on the potential of wearable computing devices used by individuals when encountering organisations. It is not a normatively desired form of privacy²²⁷ but an impressive form of political performance art,²²⁸ aimed at problematising surveillance, and as such it is valuable. However, sousveillance is also a source of concern from many perspectives. It has to be taken into consideration that the surveillant assemblage can use sousveillance for its own purposes,²²⁹ and can take advantage of disadvantage. More importantly, there is no guarantee that wearable computing will never get on the wrong side and will never be used against individuals (neighbours, wives, husbands, lovers, co-workers, etc.).

Naturally, there are more consolidated solutions, too, which do not demand the abandonment of the existing privacy paradigm and the giving up of the search for tools of hiding from the gaze, but see great prospects in transparency mechanisms. Those who represent this view have recognised that both privacy and transparency policies have their own limits but that both values should persist despite difficulties. They also seem to accept that the chance of either one profoundly depends on the fate of the other.

Advocates of consolidated mechanisms demand both legal (institutional) and non-legal (non-institutional) solutions. Regarding legal instruments, Lyon highlights the importance of the enforceability of transparency that may be achieved through implementing a set of policies and Freedom of Information laws, including penalties that may be imposed on those who break the rules.²³⁰ Lyon also emphasises that a much broader coalition of affected actors is needed if transparency is really to occur in a routine way.²³¹ However, it should be kept in mind that maintaining opacity might be in the interest of stakeholders from many perspectives (business interests, informational property rights holders, etc.). As Gandy points out, “[i]t seems unreasonable to expect that those who use these techniques will be the best sources of public awareness of the consequences of their use.” This underpins the responsibility of journalism, the academic sphere, and advocates to communicate tirelessly to individuals the capacities of surveillance practices.²³² The extent to which

transparency prevails in the future will be crucial. As far as it does, according to Foucault, surveillance should not be feared “to degenerate into tyranny”. 233

2.5 RIGHTS, FREEDOMS, AND THE RULE OF LAW

2.5.1 Rights and freedoms

Fundamental rights are normative moral requirements that democratic states are engaged with and give effect to under any circumstances. Hence, every democratic political regime is responsible to protect its citizens adequately against emerging threats to fundamental rights. In the digital age, democratic states are witnessing a major transformation in power relations that has a profound impact on citizens' rights and freedoms, and thus poses serious challenges to these rights and freedoms. Existing concepts and laws developed for protecting fundamental rights do not always provide ready answers to these developments. In order to be able properly to meet the social needs of the information society and to provide adequate safeguards against new dangers threatening the equality and freedom of individuals, the system of protection of fundamental rights has had to be renewed over and over again. The extension of the catalogue of fundamental rights through legislative or judicial development in order to protect the information autonomy of the person is a progressive manifestation of such renewal.

However, even if law is expected to provide adequate guarantees and tools to solve such problems, one should be aware that the realisation of fundamental rights as normative moral requirements does not necessarily presuppose the use of legal means; nor can legal instruments alone always guarantee the realisation of the moral requirements. In addition, using legal instruments in the area of fundamental rights poses serious risks, since law is always double-faced: even if it serves as a guarantee of freedom, the rule itself is a restriction at the same time. Expanding the range of legal instruments may be useful in situations where these moral requirements cannot otherwise be guaranteed to prevail. The form and extent of such uses of legal instruments, and their effectiveness, depend on the political and constitutional culture and traditions.

From the range of information rights, it is the right to privacy – or its sister right of narrower scope, data protection – which is often the one that most conflicts with surveillance practices. The right to privacy is recognised both in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU; however, the level of protection of this right is not equivalent in the different legal systems existing within the EU. The different levels of protection and the variety of legal instruments applied reflect the cultural diversity and differences in legal traditions in countries of the EU. 234 The ECHR therefore provides only a minimum legal standard to be met by all Members States of the EU, within which national jurisdictions have a relatively wide room for manoeuvre. As a clear attempt to legitimise and standardise the framework of manoeuvring, the so-called doctrine of

“margin of appreciation” has been developed as a response to concerns of national governments that warned that international obligations could threaten the interests of national security. This doctrine has been frequently applied in the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in cases involving the violation of the right to private life by state surveillance practices. Some important ECtHR cases are discussed in some depth in a later section. But jurisprudential development is also relevant from another aspect: courts have developed new fundamental rights responding to the needs of information (surveillance) societies, such as the “confidentiality of information systems and the fundamental right to ensure their integrity” (by the German Federal Constitutional Court) or the “right to anonymous speech” (by the US Supreme Court).

2.5.2 The rule of law

We have discussed the rule of law in Deliverable 1.1, but here we give a more general and succinct treatment of its importance. The rule of law is one of the pillars of democratic constitutional states and societies. Having its roots in classical Greek though and springing from ancient Greek philosophers, this principle has a broad meaning and wide-ranging implications in democratic systems. Though Western democracies tend to take the rule of law for granted within their democratic constitutional framework, the meaning and practical enforcement of this principle are changing as a result of the rise of surveillance technologies.

Although an analysis of the origins of the rule of law would be outside the scope of this contribution, it is necessary to define the broad burdens of this principle. The meaning of the rule of law can be sourced to two main theoretical formulations, each coming in three distinct forms. They are alternative and complementary expressions that both contribute to describe the content of the principle. The rule of law has a formal and a substantive meaning. From a formal perspective, the rule of law has the connotations of (I) rule by law (law as an instrument of government action); (II) formal legality (legislative process); and (III) democracy (consent determines the content of law). In substantive terms, the rule of law consists in (I) individual rights; (II) justice/right to dignity; and (III) social welfare (substantive equality/welfare). Therefore, formal conceptions of the rule of law focus on how law is adopted and on the nature of rules, whereas substantive theories also include requirements about the content and practical enforcement of the law (thus implying justice and moral requirements).

Although the meaning of the rule of law can be referred to unambiguous theoretical categories, the role of the rule of law in democratic legal systems might be misleading. In fact, there are two main paradoxes related to the rule of law within

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democratic systems. First, governments are called to propose and pass legislation which limit the very same state power. Nevertheless, they are bound to comply with those pieces of legislation that impose restrictions on state powers. Second, the state gives its authority to judges who are called to contest the way the state uses its powers. The paradox of the state’s limiting its own powers is called the Rechtsstaat paradox. These two paradoxes are typical of all democratic systems.238

2.5.3 The rule of law, democracy and surveillance

As has been pointed out, like “liberty” or “equality”, the principle of the rule of law is a contestable concept on which an overwhelming consensus is lacking. It is the highest expression of the “checks and balances” principle endorsed by the various and different constitutional traditions of democratic states.241 The rule of law is one of the cornerstones of constitutionalism and democracy. It frames the delicate balance between authoritative powers and civil society in democratic contexts in which citizens entrust governments in exchange for their accountability, which was discussed earlier. As mentioned before, democracy is a fundamental component of the rule of law and this latter, in turn, is one of the fundamental premises of democracy. Thus, a sustainable democracy presumes and maintains the rule of law.242 Authoritative powers find their way to democracy by recognising human rights and liberties. This recognition implies that democratic governments exercise their legitimate powers through opacity and transparency tools243 and the safeguarding of citizens’ negative and positive liberty.244

Conducting surveillance is a legitimate activity conducted by the state to protect itself and its citizens; for example, in crime prevention and in combating anti-democratic terrorist threats. The issue is how to keep such practices in check, ensuring that they


239 Several authors have provided explanations for the Rechtsstaat paradox. In the 18th century Montesquieu solved it through the trias politica. In Montesquieu’s words, “When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive”. De Montesquieu, Charles-Louis, The Spirit of the Laws, 1748, (translated by Thomas Nugent), Batoche Books, Kitchener, Ontario, Canada, 2001, p. 173.


243 Opacity tools are intended to safeguard the individual’s freedom and autonomy with respect to state authorities, whereas transparency tools are aimed to make the state accountable and responsible before its citizens. Gutwirth, Serge and Paul De Hert, “Regulating Profiling in a Democratic Constitutional State” in Mireille Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth (eds.) Profiling the European Citizen. Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, Springer, 2008, pp. 271-293.

are “proportionate” and “necessary”. This points to the central role played by privacy and data protection in the discourse on the rule of law, democracy and surveillance, as two human values and fundamental human rights. De Hert and Gutwirth emphasise the constitutional nature of privacy and data protection, considering privacy as a tool of opacity and data protection as a tool of transparency. In fact, these do not only serve as regulators and controllers of state powers, but do also represent a safeguard against the indiscriminate and pervasive use of surveillance technologies. Privacy and data protection do not simply consist in a set of rules and in legislative provisions, but are instrumental values that contribute to the achievement of fundamental constitutional rights and to the development of a democratic society.

The close and delicate relationship between the rule of law, democracy and surveillance is not a novelty, whether in surveillance studies or in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. In fact, the ECtHR case law on the use of surveillance technologies is greatly devoted to the search for a balance between surveillance and democracy and finds its main legal basis in Article 8 of the ECHR. In Klass, the Court, being aware of the danger secret surveillance poses of “undermining or even destroying democracy on the ground of defending it” underlined the need to establish legal safeguards to the arbitrary use of surveillance in order to ensure democracy. It stated that “any individual measure of surveillance has to comply with the strict conditions and procedures laid down in the legislation”, and that “powers of secret

247 In fact, privacy and data protection are considered as “intermediate” values and notably as tools through which “more fundamental values are pursued”; see Rouvroy, Antoinette and Yves Poulet, “The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy and Democracy”, in Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poulet, Paul De Hert, Cécile de Terwangne and Sjaak Nouwt (eds.), Reinventing Data Protection?, Springer, Dordrecht, 2009, pp. 45-76, p. 53.
248 Article 8 of the ECHR provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
249 ECtHR, Klass and Others v. Germany, judgement of 6 December 1978, Series A no. 28. In this case the applicants (G. Klass, P. Lubberger, J. Nussbruch, H.J. Pohl and D. Selb) claimed that two German laws passed in 1968 (an amendment to Article 10 §2 of the Basic Law and Act of 13 August) that restricted the right to secrecy of email, post and telecommunications breached the ECHR, notably art. 6, 8 and 13. In this case, the ECtHR found no breach of the Convention had occurred.
250 ECtHR, Klass and Others v. Germany, judgement of 6 December 1978, Series A no. 28, para. 49.
251 ECtHR, Klass and Others v. Germany, judgement of 6 December 1978, Series A no. 28, para. 40.
surveillance of citizens are tolerable under the Convention only in so far as strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions”. 252

The ECtHR has long been considering the rule of law as one of the crucial legal requirements to ascertain the boundaries between surveillance and democracy. Referring to the expression “in accordance with the law” (Article 8.2 ECHR), the ECtHR recognises that any interference by public authorities with the right to respect for private life and correspondence “must have some basis in domestic law”, 253 where the word “law” covers both written (or statute) and unwritten law. 254 Secondly, any law which derogates to Article 8 ECHR must be “adequately accessible” (the citizen must be able to have an adequate indication of the legal rules applicable to a given case), sufficiently precise and foreseeable (“its consequences need to be foreseeable with absolute certainty”). 255 Nevertheless, in Malone, 256 the ECtHR stated that any law that interferes with the right guaranteed by Article 8.1 ECHR “must indicate the scope of any discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard of the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference”. 257 The ECtHR recalled this jurisprudence in Kruslin and Huvig, 258 and more recently in Khan 259 by saying that exceptions to Article 8.1 ECHR are legitimate if surveillance measures (such as tapping and interception of telephone conversations) are foreseen by national laws which must be “particularly precise”, 260 clear and detailed in order to prevent abuses from national authorities and comply with the rule of law. 261

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252 ECtHR, Klass and Others v. Germany, judgement of 6 December 1978, Series A no. 28, para. 42.
253 ECtHR, Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgement of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61, para. 86.
254 ECtHR, The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, judgement of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, para. 47.
255 ECtHR, The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, judgement of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, para. 49 and ECtHR, Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgement of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61, paras. 87-88.
256 ECtHR, Malone v. the United Kingdom, judgement of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82. Mr. Malone claimed that his correspondence had been intercepted, his telephone lines tapped and his telephone metered unlawfully by the British Post Office (on behalf of the police) within the general context of a criminal investigation. The ECtHR found that an infringement to art. 8 ECHR had occurred as the law of England and Wales did not indicate “with reasonable clarity the scope and matter of the relevant discretion conferred on the public authorities”. ECtHR, Malone v. the United Kingdom, para. 79.
257 ECtHR, Malone v. the United Kingdom, judgement of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82, para. 68.
258 ECtHR, Kruslin v. France, judgement of 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176-A and Huvig v. France, judgement of 24 April 1990, Series A no. 176-B. In both cases the applicants (convicted for murder and tax evasion, respectively) contested the decision of French police authorities that had tapped their telephone conversations. In this case, the Court found that the interception of conversations infringed art. 8 ECHR and the applicants’ right to respect for their correspondence and private life given that French legislation on interception of telephone conversations did not ‘afford adequate safeguards against various possible abuses’ of national authorities. ECtHR, Kruslin v. France, para. 35.
259 ECtHR, Khan v. the United Kingdom, judgement of 12 May 2000, Series A no. 290.
261 ECtHR, par. 32-36 of the Kruslin judgment and point 1 of its operative provisions and paras. 31-35 of the Huvig judgment.
2.6 CONCLUSION

As shown above, there is a significant ECtHR jurisprudence on the rule of law that provides several interpretative guidelines on the content and meaning of this principle, particularly as regards the implementation of surveillance measures. It concerns not only the rule of law in its formal meaning but also its qualitative and content-related facets. The importance given to the rule of law by the ECtHR is deliberate and appropriate, given the widespread use of surveillance technologies in today’s societies and the potential threat they pose to individual rights and freedoms, and so to democracy. As the Court recognised in Malone, surveillance implies the exercise of a power that, “because of its inherent secrecy, carries with it a danger of abuse of a kind that is potentially easy in individual cases and could have harmful consequences for democratic society as a whole”. As the ECtHR highlights, the rule of law represents a legal guarantee against the indiscriminate and pervasive power of national authorities in the exercise of surveillance measures and a bulwark of democracy and the constitutional state.

2.7 THE GOVERNANCE OF SURVEILLANCE

More than any specific law or body of laws, the rule of law and a strong determination to defend and promote rights and freedoms are central to the formation of regimes that are able to keep the forces of surveillance in check. Political scientists have gone beyond a traditional focus on government and legislation as the main subject of the study of state power and decision-making. Government, in the sense of executive, legislative and judicial institutions of the state – although themselves testifying somewhat to a plurality of decision-makers, especially if sub-national levels are considered as well – now tends to be seen as one of a number of sites of power or agents of control, albeit it remains the one that is vested with legal or constitutional authority to act in the name of the state. “Governance” draws attention to a pattern of relations or networks embracing the state and society that may span different jurisdictional levels, through which functions are jointly performed. It denotes that rules and decisions cannot be attributed only to government in each legal jurisdiction or country. These interrelationships exacerbate the problem of accountability in a democratic system, because policy decisions and their implementation through administrative action and the use of resources are not confined to single organisations with hierarchical lines of bureaucratic accountability, as Rhodes has argued. The governance of surveillance denotes that there are many dispersed agencies and mechanisms that aim to apply legal, ethical and practical constraints upon surveillance to keep it within bounds and therefore consistent with the values of

ECtHR, Malone v. the United Kingdom, judgement of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82, para. 81.


democratic societies founded on the rule of law. In terms of the online environment, this constellation has been colourfully portrayed by Westin in terms of the Wild West of cyberspace: “As in the earliest frontier days in America, the Internet abounds with modern-day cattlemen, sheep-herders, farmers, saloon keepers, whores, and hacker-gunmen, with the influences of the schoolmarm, minister, sheriff, and judge also struggling to be heard and felt”. Insofar as the internet is an important site of surveillance, its governance is “multifaceted, complex, and far from transparent”. This not only serves as a portrait of the Internet, but of other domains in which surveillance is practiced.

Moreover, surveillance itself is used by myriad organisations in the private and public sectors for a variety of purposes, and may involve the creation of an “assemblage” of mechanisms provided by different Wild West agents. Whether these cohere in ways that pose greater threats to privacy and liberties than they might otherwise do is an empirical question. Haggerty and Ericson believe they do, but this seems contingent on the efforts and capabilities of actors in ‘powerful institutions’ to harness, “integrate, combine, and coordinate” these separate and partly disconnected surveillance technologies and practices; however, the evidence of achievement is mixed, and surveillance is prone to error and resistance.

There are multiple organisational sources and practices of surveillance. They are often invisible and covert, and their practices subject to the elusive dynamics of “function creep”, and – where they form an assemblage – interactive, making it difficult to pin down who is engaging in what surveillance practices and to apply a regulatory array of legal and other controls upon the behaviour of individuals or organisations. Accountability problems exist both in surveillance and in the efforts to govern it. The regulatory landscape itself is fragmented across multiple regulatory instruments,

268 Haggerty, Kevin D. and Richard V. Ericson, “The surveillant assemblage”, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 51, No. 4, December 2000, pp. 605-622, at p. 610: “The analysis of surveillance tends to focus on the capabilities of a number of discrete technologies or social practices. Analysts typically highlight the proliferation of such phenomena and emphasize how they cumulatively pose a threat to civil liberties. We are only now beginning to appreciate that surveillance is driven by the desire to bring systems together, to combine practices and technologies and integrate them into a larger whole. It is this tendency which allows us to speak of surveillance as an assemblage, with such combinations providing for exponential increases in the degree of surveillance capacity. Rather than exemplifying Orwell’s totalitarian state-centred Oceana, this assemblage operates across both state and extra-state institutions.”
levels, jurisdictions, institutions, and domains. Governance is emphatically not an exercise of top-down authority to govern surveillance, whether within states or globally. In certain fields, such as law enforcement and counter-terrorism, it might be a question whether the forces promoting integrated surveillance are more potent and follow a faster trajectory than those who promote integrated governance or regulation. The latter are further weakened by the necessary reliance for crucial elements of regulation upon those who are themselves engaged in surveillance, whether as private companies or as governmental actors, and who therefore do not advocate strong controls.

Although the impacts of surveillance are felt in ways that go beyond the individual’s right to privacy, the governance of surveillance has empirically been largely a matter concerning the safeguarding of privacy and the protection of personal data. As mentioned in the earlier discussion of accountability, most of the existing strategies of surveillance regulation, in terms of data protection, have emphasised legal and technical arrangements for limiting surveillance and for sanctioning excesses in the activities that comprise surveillance; legal instruments were first in the field. These strategies have typically been articulated for data protection or the safeguarding of information privacy, and have largely left other areas of privacy on one side. Thus only some of Finn et al.’s seven types of privacy come directly into the compass of the governance of surveillance as conventionally and narrowly conceived in terms of information privacy, except insofar as privacy invasion involves one or more of the phases of processing of personal data. Within the narrower focus, a sometimes bewildering and patchy array of sectoral and general laws and institutional mechanisms to enforce legal compliance, self-regulatory instruments including codes of practice, and technological tools and design have attracted the most attention from policy-makers and commentators. However, both within these and additionally, mechanisms of accountability and information governance are now receiving greater attention, as we have shown, along with processes of public awareness-raising and individuals’ control over their own data.

The governance of surveillance can be seen in terms of policy instruments and policy actors, whether in one or several jurisdictions and at one or more levels from the local to the global. In the world of data protection, instruments and actors form a regime of governance that work towards limiting surveillance and protecting individuals’ rights and societal values regarding privacy and a range of associated human values. Bennett and Raab have analysed the repertory of transnational policy instruments arising in several arenas, including the European Union, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Asia-Pacific arena, and international standardisation bodies. Law is one of the principle means of

272 Finn, Rachel, David Wright and Michael Friedewald, “Seven Types of Privacy”, 2013 (forthcoming). Their seven types are privacy of the person; of behaviour and action; of communications; of data and image; of thought and feelings; of location and space; and of association.
governing surveillance, although it perhaps legitimises it more than preventing or remediying its excesses. There has been a proliferation of legal measures at national and sub-national levels, including privacy and data protection laws in at least 76 national jurisdictions and many others in component parts of these states. Other laws operate with regard to specific forms of activity in which surveillance is practiced, such as telecommunications, health, policing, finance, and child protection, and many of these laws are not specific only to the protection of personal data or to the private or public sectors. National and sub-national laws tend to create regulatory agencies, such as the data protection authorities (DPAs) legislated by statute or by international instruments; these authorities, in turn, operate in elaborate international, regional and other networks of regulation to control information processing practices that have implications for privacy. In the EU, the European Data Protection Supervisor and the Article 29 Working Party comprising the DPAs of the 27 Member States have been the most prominent institutions of regulatory governance.

Other instruments are of a more self-regulatory nature, adopted by single organisations or trade bodies as codes of practice, commitments, standards, and seals (in the online environment). Codes of practice may also be mandated by law in certain countries, or else strongly encouraged and shaped by legal instruments and regulatory authorities. The accountability movement, discussed earlier, is the latest effort at self-regulation, generally speaking, with the possibility of being inscribed in the proposed EU Regulation as an international instrument. Then there is a range of technological instruments, aimed at designing or harnessing controls inherent in the technical means of surveillance in order to reduce or eliminate the threats they might pose to privacy and other values. “Privacy-enhancing Technologies” (PETs) and more recently, “Privacy by Design” are the general labels under which these instruments exist, although their practical implementation lags far behind the promise their promoters hold for them. The wide variety of technological tools also includes data encryption, identity assurance systems for anonymity and pseudonymity, and filtering technologies against internet monitoring. Beyond all these instruments, but serving to support them, is the creation of greater public awareness of surveillance and its

implications for everyday life. This role is one of many that are performed by regulatory bodies, privacy advocates\textsuperscript{280}, the media, and legislatures.\textsuperscript{281}

At this point, it is important to shift the discussion to the policy actors who wield the various instruments of governance. Even within one jurisdiction, there are many players. Raab and Koops identify a non-exhaustive list that may include constitution-makers, legislatures, DPAs, courts, government departments, private companies, activist organisations, academics, journalists, consumers, citizens, and technology developers.\textsuperscript{282} There are many potential and actual connections among them. Empirical studies would highlight these, showing the extent to which they are present in any specific governance activity on any issue. They would also see whether they constitute either a coherent and integrated regime of surveillance governance or a disparate collection of players each wielding a different policy instrument but with no overall strategy or leadership to develop synergies and reduce conflicts within the constellation of governance actors. But the fact that many forms of surveillance involve flows of information and practices that go beyond jurisdictional boundaries means that the cast of characters involved in governance likewise crosses these borders and comprises an even more complex network of regulatory contributors, one that is still in the early stage of formation but with doubtful prospects of rapid further development.

3. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE

The political perspective on surveillance given here complements the social and legal perspectives. It also overlaps with them in the sense that, with regard to the social perspective, it sees political and governance processes as embedded within social processes, values, demands and resilience potential, taking their strength and sense of surveillance limits from society, and giving back surveillance policies as well as controls on that surveillance itself. With regard to the legal perspective, the political perspective overlaps in the sense that it understands democracy as embedded in the rule of law and in an appreciation of rights and freedoms that may be at stake in whatever surveillance policies the political system creates, but also in whatever surveillance-limiting measures it undertakes as well. In particular, this Deliverable precedes the discussion of the legal perspective, which has its own emphases and priorities, although those do not necessarily cut across or take issue with either the political or social perspectives.

The chapters of Deliverable 2.2 have tried to capture something of this confluence while at the same time seeing the tensions between competing factors and forces. In a


short piece of descriptive and analytical; writing such as this, it has not been possible to explore the political perspective to a fuller extent, whether in terms of different areas of surveillance, geography or jurisdiction, or in terms of comparisons across these dimensions, although broad distinctions have been drawn between established democracies and ones with a recent a history of repressive rule and intensive surveillance. Much less has it been able to find the basis for specific hypotheses to be tested by further systematic research. However, given the patchy nature of the evidence, these chapters have aimed shy of endorsing particular conclusions based on insubstantial empirical findings, much as those conclusions may be plausible and attractive: for example, that the media are (or are not) responsible for inventing fears; that the state of public opinion is (or is not) what certain surveys conclude it to be; or that the law and public policy processes are sufficient (or insufficient) to keep surveillance in bounds.

That said, a few main themes emerge from the political perspective. These are as follows:

1. Surveillance practices of all kinds impinge on a large range of rights, freedoms, liberties, and social and political relationships and processes that affect the nature and texture of life in democratic societies and political systems.

2. Public attitudes, perceptions, fears, expectations and demands are shaped by many forces, among which the mass media are one of the most powerful, tending towards a particular appreciation of surveillance, its technologies, and its role in reducing threats and the level of fear.

3. Social insecurity feeds policy demands for surveillance that tend to limit genuine debate and to ignore the disadvantages and externalities of making life safer and more secure through surveillance; and the resilience of society or, on the other hand, the precautionary anticipation of threats, are in part arbitrated by these demands and by the nature of deliberative processes.

4. The accountability and transparency of surveillance, and the rule of law, are essential in a democratic society, and need to be improved and made potent in order to limit surveillance.

5. The governance of surveillance, and surveillance policy-making, are highly complex and sometimes ephemeral processes that need to be comprehended and rationalised if surveillance is to be regulated in accordance with democratic values.
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